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Corruption costs the society millions of euros every year. As several studies have demonstrated, it 
has a negative impact on the economic growth since it distracts important resources from their best uses. In 
the procurement system, for example, giving a competitive advantage to economic players with less high 
productivity, in this case corruption undermines the development of an efficient entrepreneurial system, in-
creasing public expenditure, and consequently the indebtedness of the states and the fiscal pressure to 
which citizens are subject to. At the same time, it makes public intervention programs less effective because 
the quality of investments and services is not adequate.  
However, corruption also has a negative impact at the social level. In fact, generating a non-equitable distri-
bution of income, with a concentration of resources in the hands of a few people who do not qualify for the 
benefit, it creates social tensions and undermines the general trust which is essential to guarantee the pre-
dictability of social, economic and institutional relationships. 
In theory, these economic and social distorting effects of corruption can be counteracted by reinforc-
ing the governance system. However, the facts of the matter show that only some societies succeed in con-
trolling this type of crime, while corruption more often becomes systematic with the passage of time.  
This research tries to explain why this happens, examining, on the one hand, factors which may fos-
ter corruption, and, on the other hand, results obtained with the introduction of a specific anti-corruption 
measure. These analyses refer to Italy since it has a high level of corruption (despite being a developed and 
democratic country) and its distribution across Italian regions is not homogeneous.  
Although corruption has been the topic on which many studies have already focused their attention, 
we think that there is still a need to deepen the investigation. In fact, while the recent economic downturn 
has stressed the necessity to stop the destruction of public wealth that corruption provokes, its continuing 
spread has made it increasingly urgent to understand what levers on which to act on to curb its scope. 
Moreover, with respect to previous studies this research: 
1. investigates the relationship between corruption and factors favouring it, not on the basis of a perceived 
(national) level of corruption but considering data which measure real corruption at the regional level.  
In fact, in some countries, such as Italy, the national boundaries may contain areas which are heteroge-
neous so that a synthesis at national level of this crime can provide a distorted view of things, underes-
timating some effects or overestimating others; 
2. evaluates results obtained by the introduction of anti-corruption measures on the basis of actual whis-
tleblowing and not simply considering intentions to blow the whistle. In fact, Mesmer-Magnus J. R. and 
Viswesvaran C. (2005) have proved with the findings of research conducted on whistleblowing intentions 
cannot be translated into conclusions about effective whistleblowing; 
3. combines qualitative and quantitative analysis to better clarify the findings.  
The results of this study suggest that corruption is widespread in Italy, first because some cultural 
determinants (high masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and short-term orientation along with the exist-
ence of discrepancies between some cultural values and practices) favour it. Instead, the variability at the 
regional level of this crime is mainly linked to the distribution of social and economic well-being and social 
capital; in fact, where these two factors are more present, the level of corruption is lower.  
Moreover, the fact that clientelism is more widespread than corruption in the country, suggests that proba-
bly it can represent not simply a form of corruption but also a possible cause of this crime.  
However, the high level of corruption also seems to be linked to the limited capability of anti-corruption 
measures to prevent this crime. Analysing internal whistleblowing, we have found that civil servants, in 
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2016, rarely have reported wrongdoings. This could be explained not only by the fact that the public sector is 
composed by many small size organizations where it is easier to understand who has blown the whistle (so 
that civil servants prefer not to report it to avoid any retaliation), but also by the fact that public administra-
tions lack human and economic resources to effectively implement this measure and the legislation in force 
in 2016 did not guarantee adequate safeguards for those who report it.  
Hence, at the end, corruption seems to be the result not only of cultural, economic and social reasons but al-
so the result of the lack of a political will to state effective anti-corruption measures, which is linked to clien-
telism. 
Although many studies have found that transparency, ensured by the introduction of the Freedom of Infor-
mation laws, could represent an important tool in the fight against corruption, some scholars have shown 
that the results obtained depend on several factors. The most important are represented by: the quality of 
laws which are related to the political will and to the pressure exercised by lobbies; citizens exercise of the 
right of access and their political engagement; the capacity of public administrations to implement the rules 
introduced also considering the economic, human and technological resources available in the public sector.  
This suggests that the political will, the availability of adequate resources in the public sector and 
civic pressure constitute crucial preconditions for the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and that up-
on their presence depend on the success in controlling this type of crime. 
The study is composed by three papers. The first paper investigates cultural determinants and fur-
ther factors explaining the high level of corruption in Italy and its different distribution at the regional level. 
The second paper considers factors which have affected, in 2016, internal whistleblowing in the Italian public 
sector, evaluating also its effectiveness in fighting corruption. The third paper systematically reviews the in-
ternational literature on the Freedom of information laws (Foil). Underlining preconditions required for their 
introduction, factors affecting their performance and some outcomes achieved, it offers some tips on the 















Despite being a democratic and developed country, Italy is characterised by a high level of corrup-
tion not homogeneously distributed in its regions. 
This paper investigates factors generating this situation: first, it considers the cultural features of 
the country which may create a breeding ground for this crime; secondly, it inspects factors which 
help to explain the differentiated breakdown of corruption and clientelism, a specific type of corrup-
tion. 
The analyses of the Italian culture based on Hofstede's model and House's Global project dataset 
along with findings of previous studies which have scrutinised the relationship between corruption 
and culture, suggest that the high level of corruption in the country can be favoured by the pres-
ence of high masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and short-term orientation along with the ex-
istence of discrepancies between some cultural values and practices. 
Furthermore, the empirical analyses based on OLS method reveals that the regional level of social 
and economic well-being as long as the level of social capital are significant in explaining the local 
variability of corruption, while the spread of clientelism, is defined by the same variables (social 
and economic well-being and social capital) and by two additional factors: citizens' control over in-
stitutions and their level of education. However, the level of clientelism in Italian region, suggests 






Over the past few decades, corruption, defined by Transparency International (2015) as 
"the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," has reached such proportions as to attract inter-
national attention and promote a joint effort of nations to contain its expansion. Its manifestations 
have become the most varied: the forms of exchange adopted have gradually become more so-
phisticated including compensations consisting in transfers to tax havens, fictitious hiring of rela-
tives and fake consultations in favour of nominee companies (Vannucci A., 2010), while the net-
work of the subjects involved has extended to include the bureaucratic apparatus (petty corrup-
tion) and the political component (grand corruption) indiscriminately (Tanzi V., 1998). 
While scholars who have analysed the consequences of the phenomenon have focused 
their attention on its negative impact on economic growth (Mauro P., 1997; Del Monte A., and Pa-
pagni E., 2007; Lasciandra M. and Milleaci E., 2017), those who have studied the causes from which 
it originates, have highlighted the correlation of corruption with a multitude of factors. 
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This study aims at examining in depth the investigations referred to this second branch of 
research, by analysing the Italian case. This case is particularly suitable for the analysis of the caus-
es of corruption, for two reasons.   
First, corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Italy, although it is a democratic and developed 
country (Vanucci A., 2010). The Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency Interna-
tional that measures, on a scale from zero (very corrupt state) to 100 (little corrupt country) cor-
ruption in the public and political sector of 176 nations of the world, in 2016 classified Italy at the 
60th place with a score of 47 on 100. Although this indicator showed an improvement with respect 
to previous years, since the adoption of Law No. 190/2012 (the so-called anti-corruption law) has 
led to a gradual reduction of citizen perceived level of corruption, doubts exist about the fact that 
corruption has diminished. The European Commission in its first anti-corruption report emphasised 
the failure of Italian 2012 reforms stressing that "further efforts need to be made to ensure effec-
tive implementation and monitoring of the anti-corruption legal framework" (Canestri D., 2014).   
Secondly, there is a substantial divergence in the level of corruption among Italian regions, but the 
analysis of the causes which determine these differences could be simplified by the fact that the 
regional contexts are characterised by the same controls, criminal laws, or administrative struc-
tures (Lasciandra M. and Millemaci E., 2017).   
The analysis of factors explaining Italian corruption is conducted in two steps. 
First, by considering the importance that culture exerts in determining the level of corruption 
(GRECO in The Fourth Evaluation Round referred to “Corruption prevention with respect to mem-
bers of parliament, judges and prosecutors”, has suggested that “corruption has to become a mat-
ter of culture and not simply only rules”) the cultural features of the country which may create a 
breeding ground for corruption are examined. 
Secondly, factors which help explain the regional variability in the level of this crime are examined 
using multiple regressions model. Data are (mainly) referred to the year 2016, when the country 
was still trying to overcome the effects of the global crisis. In previous years, huge efforts had been 
required from citizens: governments had increased tax and had introduced austerity packages to 
contain the public debt and the nations’ budget deficit. However, despite the lack of resources la-
mented by political leaders, periodically the press revealed the waste of public money linked to 
poor administration or corruption involving institutions, and this exacerbated the destruction of 
citizens’ confidence in public service. To regain citizens’ trust in institutions and to change the opin-
ion of international investors, since 2012, the structural reforms undertaken with the purpose to 
boost the economic growth had been accompanied by the introduction of anticorruption 
measures, which included several mechanisms of fraud prevention, detection and repression 
aimed at raising efficiency and integrity in the delivery of public services. Although L.190/2012 (an-
ticorruption law) had been subsequently enhanced by L. 114/2014 and by L. 69/2015, corruption, 
nepotism and patronage were still widespread in 2016. 
The analyses of Italian culture based on Hofstede's model and House's Global project dataset and 
findings of previous studies which have scrutinised the relationship between corruption and cul-
ture suggest that the high level of corruption in the country can be facilitated by the presence of 
high masculinity, high uncertainty avoidance and short-term orientation along with the existence 
of discrepancies between some values and practices. 
The comparison at the regional level of corruption and clientelism, which represents a specific type 
of corruption, with some factors capturing specific social, institutional and economic (theoretically 
plausible) determinants linked to bribery, shows that: 
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1. the regional level of social and economic well-being as long as the level of social capital are sig-
nificant in explaining the local variability of corruption, 
2. the variability at the regional level of clientelism is linked to the same variables (social and eco-
nomic well-being and social capital) plus two additional factors: citizens' control over institu-
tion and their level of education.   
The statistical relationship between corruption and clientelism also suggests that clientelism is 
probably not only a form of corruption, but also a cause of this crime as indicated by Hickens 
(Rothstein B. and Varraich A., 2014). 
The rest of this piece proceeds with the following steps. First, after a brief analysis of the 
literature on the culture-corruption relationship, it describes the cultural features which can ex-
plain corruption in Italy.  Secondly, considering the distribution of corruption in the country, it 
identifies some factors that can contribute to explaining the regional differences in corruption's 
level. In that section, the choice of the data and the method of analysis adopted are specified, and 
the results of regressions are presented. Thirdly, in the fourth section, conclusions are drawn, and 
implications are discussed. 
 
 
1.Cultural features creating a breeding ground for corruption. 
 
a) The relationship between culture and corruption in the literature 
 
Culture, defined as "the accumulation of shared meanings, rituals, norms, and traditions 
that distinguishes members of on society" is perhaps the cause that most affect the ability of cor-
ruption to take root in a given context (Treisman D., 2000; Harrison L. E., 2000; Hira A. and Shiao K., 
2016; Crittenden V.L. et al. 2009; Barr A. and Serra D., 2010). As effectively summarised by Evgenij 
M. et al. (2016), there are three general ways of seeing the relationship between culture and cor-
ruption. Indeed, it can be considered: 
1. an integral part of the culture that can be analysed considering civil and economic society's fea-
tures, its customs, beliefs, and values; 
2. a temporary dysfunction of the culture; 
3. a phenomenon linked to the more stable component of the culture which reproduces itself since 
it is handed down over time from generation to generation. 
A substantial literature has examined the relationship between culture and corruption; it is 
mainly based on international comparisons of the cultural features described by the models of 
Shwartz (1992,1994), Inglehart (1997), Hofstede (1980, 2001) and House (2004), with the levels of 
perceived corruption detected in various countries by Transparency International. The common 
goal of these studies is to highlight societies’ cultural determinants associated with a high level of 
corruption. 
For example, papers based on Hofstede’s model, have tried to detect, for countries charac-
terised by a high Corruption Perception Index, the recurrence of the following cultural determi-
nants: 
1. power distance, which measures the acceptance of significant differences in the distribution of 
power among individuals in the community, 
2. individualism/collectivism, which distinguishes between societies that focus the attention on in-
dividual well-being, their autonomy and their objectives (individualist societies), and communities 
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that consider the individual as a member of a group which protects him/her in exchange for 
his/her loyalty (collectivist societies), 
3. masculinity/femininity, which distinguishes between materialist cultures, strongly oriented to 
the achievement of wealth (masculine cultures), and cultures that aim at the quality of work and 
life, the equality between men and women, and the satisfaction of individuals’ basic needs (femi-
nine cultures), 
4. uncertainty avoidance, which considers people's aversion to risk and consequent measures 
aimed at giving greater stability to their environment, 
5. long/short-term orientation, depending on whether the actions performed by individuals point 
to a long-term result or an immediate profit. 
These analyses have shown that corrupt countries usually are characterised by: significant differ-
ences in power distribution (high power distance) (Husted B.W. ,1999; Sanyal R.N. and Samanta S. 
K, 2002; Davis J.H. and Ruhe J. A , 2003;  Achim M.V. , 2016); extended interpersonal relationships, 
which favor logics such as nepotism and recommendations (collectivism) (Zheng X. et al., 2013; 
and Sadok E. G. et al., 2016; Achim M.V., 2016; Jha C. and Panda B., 2017; Haque S.T.M. and Mo-
hammad S.N., 2013); a materialistic vision (high masculinity) (Husted B.W. ,1999; Sanyal R.N. and 
Samanta S. K , 2002) and the tendency to reach the objectives by any means and in the short term 
(short term orientation) (Achim M.V. ,2016); a risk aversion contrasted with excessive regulation, 
which leads to an increase in the opacity of the system and the consequent proliferation of im-
proper conduct (high uncertainty avoidance) (Husted B.W. , 1999; Motascu M. I., 2010; Haque 
S.T.M. and Mohammad S.N., 2013). 
Gelbrich K. et al. (2016) considering the existence of discrepancies between values and cul-
tural practices (cultural discrepancies) not considered in Hofstede’s model, have made reference to 
a different model of culture analysis, the GLOBE project data set of House, which in addition to fac-
tors such as power distance and uncertainty avoidance, considers the following competencies: 
1. in-group collectivism, as a measure of the degree of loyalty and cohesion of the individual to 
organisations where he/she is a member (including the family), 
2. institutional collectivism, which expresses the degree to which institutional practices encour-
age and reward the collective distribution of resources, 
3. assertiveness orientation, which measures the assertive, confrontational or aggressive behav-
iour of individuals in interpersonal relationships, 
4. future orientation, i.e., the tendency of individuals to consider their actions in a future per-
spective, accepting the deferral of rewards, 
5. performance orientation, which refers to the extent to which the company encourages and re-
wards those with a high-performance orientation, 
6. humane orientation, based on the tendency to reward fair and altruistic behaviour, 
7. gender egalitarianism, considering the extent to which societies minimize gender role differ-
ences and discriminate people concerning gender. 
Taking into consideration these discrepancies, Gelbrich K. et al. (2016), have highlighted that: 
• pervasive corruption (also called predictable corruption) is negatively correlated to in-group 
collectivism discrepancy, i.e., to situations in which the reciprocal exchange, aimed at favouring 
members of the group, is more present at the level of values than in practice or, vice-versa, is 
more practiced than desirable; in this case, in fact, corruption is not socially acceptable, 
• corruption related to situations of uncertainty and arbitrariness (defined as arbitrary corrup-
tion), is positively associated with discrepancies referred to people's orientation towards the 
future, which manifest in an inability to plan clearly and precisely or in an over-planning that 
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leads to increased ambiguity. Furthermore, these relationships are related to the level of na-
tional wealth, as the inverse link between in-group collectivism discrepancy and predictable 
corruption is very pronounced in poor or moderately rich countries, while the positive relation-
ship between future orientation discrepancy and arbitrary corruption is very pronounced in 
rich countries. 
Referring to the GLOBE project data set, other authors have highlighted further links between a 
low level of corruption and cultural features of societies: in-group collectivism practices, human-
oriented practices and, uncertainty avoidance values (Seleim A. and Bontis N., 2009); in low ine-
quality societies, a socially supportive culture (SSC) that stimulates cooperation and social capital 
(Roy A. and Goll I., 2014); high institutional collectivism that leads people to feel part of a commu-
nity and so to behave less opportunistically and to follow rules (Lewellyb K.B. and Bao S.R.,2017); 
high power distance societies when there are rigid hierarchies that limit the discretionary power of 
managers, and that specify tasks and responsibilities of employees (Lewellyb K.B. and Bao 
S.R.,2017). 
To better clarify the links between culture and corruption, other authors have combined 
Hofstede's model, with those of Schwarts1 and Inglehart2. For example, taking together these mod-
els, Yeganeh H. (2014), has found that socio-economic development has a significant influence on 
culture and that, while low levels of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, together with indi-
vidualism, femininity, autonomy, egalitarianism, mastery, self-expression, in rational-secular cul-
tures, reduce corruption, high values of power distance and uncertainty avoidance, combined with 
collectivism, masculinity, conservatism, hierarchy, harmony, survival, in traditional-religious cul-
tures, increase the level of corruption. For Yeganeh H. (2014), the relationship between culture and 
corruption leads to a distinction between "traditional / southern / underdeveloped" countries and 
"modern / northern / developed" countries. These results are confirmed by the study of Beets S.D. 
(2005):  without applying a specific model of culture analysis, the author has highlighted that in 
countries characterised by rampant corruption people usually live in rural areas, have large families 
and have a short life expectancy; moreover, the wealthiest part of the population of these nations 




b) The relationship between culture and corruption in Italy 
 
Considering the above findings and referring to the models most commonly used to exam-
ine the culture of countries, namely Hofstede's model and House's Global project dataset, we have 
tried to highlight the cultural determinants and components prevailing in the country which can at 
least in part justify its level of corruption. 
                                                          
1 Schwarts's model considers three aspects: 1. Conservatism / affective-intellectual autonomy, which makes it possible to distin-
guish between societies based on traditions and which tend to maintain the status quo and societies pursuing individual desires, 2. 
Hierarchy / egalitarianism, depending on whether the unequal distribution of power and resources are legitimised or the im-
portance of justice and equality between individuals is emphasised, 3. Mastery / harmony, which considers the importance given to 
personal ambitions, success, and competence or the acceptance of the world emphasizing "the unity with nature." 
2 Inglehart’s model, on the other hand, assuming that economic development, cultural change, and political change go hand in 
hand, classifies cultures considering the importance of tradition and religion (distinguishing between traditional societies and secu-




Hofstede's model (www.hofstede-insight.com/country-comparison/italy/), suggests that the Italian 
culture is characterised by a high level of individuals' independence, overall in the large cities of 
the North (high individualism-76); a strong orientation towards the achievement of success (high 
level of masculinity 70); a high degree of discomfort for situations characterised by ambiguity and 
uncertainty that would justify an extensive regulation (high level of uncertainty avoidance, 75); a 
pragmatic orientation that would make planning for the future not very important (not high value 
of long-term orientation 61); the tendency to prefer equal relations and the decentralisation of 
power, especially in the North of the country (power distance 50). 
Hence, considering the literature review, the high level of corruption could be explained 
considering three cultural determinants: the importance for people to reach a successful position 
(high masculinity); the excessive regulation that would determine the opacity of the regulatory sys-
tem, its ineffectiveness and the consequent possibility of maintaining unpunished the incorrect 
conduct (high uncertainty avoidance); the short-term orientation, which would lead to achieve the 
utmost usefulness in a short time. 
The most visible among these determinants is undoubtedly uncertainty avoidance. Corrup-
tion is sometimes seen in Italy as the only weapon that the private is forced to use to quickly over-
come the too many constraints that bureaucracy imposes on citizens who want to obtain authori-
sations, concessions or permits. Moreover, sometimes the same chaotic legislation seems to foster 
corruption, as maintained by Gets and Volkema (2001): the creation of too many different rules re-
inforces bureaucracy discretion and limits the ability to prosecute crimes, facilitating the impunity 
of the corrupted ones. 
This aspect would be sadly found in the same legislation that has introduced preventive and 
subsequent forms of control against corruption. The anti-corruption law (L.190/2012), which is 
made of more than eighty paragraphs, contains seven derogations to the government for the issu-
ing of implementing decrees; moreover, its implementation entailed the enactment of several di-
rectives and guidelines by the National Anti-corruption Authority on the way in which this disci-
pline has to be interpreted and applied, and required, within each public administration, the adap-
tation of existing regulations or the approval of new ones. Although clear and precise rules are an 
essential requirement to prevent lawlessness, L. 190/2012 and the implementing decrees have also 
been subject to multiple revisions: to date, there are eleven modifications of L. 190/2012, albeit its 
objectives were clear, as international conventions previously outlined them. While this situation 
suggests a lack of political will to conduct a serious fight against corruption, on the other hand it 
points out that excessive attention to form, which delays concrete actions and subtracts energy 
from the substance, has turned the fight against corruption into a purely bureaucratic matter. 
From the model of House (globeproject.com/results/countries/ITA?menu=list) instead, it 
emerges that the Italian culture is characterised by the existence of substantial deviations between 
values and practices related to performance orientation, future orientation, human orientation, 
gender egalitarianism, and power distance. Considering practices, the country has a relatively low 
score in performance orientation (3.58), human orientation (3.63), institutional collectivism (3.68) 
and gender egalitarianism (3.24) and a high score in power distance (5.43). Moreover, considering 
the findings of Gelbrich K. et al. (2016), discrepancies between values and practices related to fu-







2.Factors affecting regional levels of corruption and clientelism 
 
This paragraph aims to identify some factors which may explain the variability at the regional level 
of corruption and clientelism. 
The relationship among these factors and the two crimes is analysed using OLS method. We devel-
op two regression models in which corruption and clientelism are respectively the dependent vari-
ables. The independent variables are constructed using factor analysis.  First, considering the find-
ings of previous studies, we have selected some indicators referring to social, institutional and 
economic variables which usually affect the level of corruption. Hence, using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) we have tried to reduce the set of our initial variables. In a following step, latent fac-
tors related to corruption and clientelism have been identified using the Factor Analysis technique. 
 
2.1 Dependent variables description 
Istat, on 12.10.2017, has published a report ("Corruption in Italy: the citizens' point of view") which 
has measured the level of corruption in Italian regions considering the number of households that 
have claimed to have been involved in corruption, during their lifetime. 43,000 persons aged be-
tween 18 and 80 in the period between October 2015 and June 2016 had been interviewed; using 
a mixed CATI and CAPI technique, the interviews were aimed at recognising concrete experiences 
of facts of corruption. These interviews, which were part of a survey on the safety of citizens, had a 
response rate of 54.2% and had assessed that 7.9% of households "have been directly involved in 
corruption events during their lives, such as, requests for money, favours, gifts or other in exchange 
for services or facilitation of transactions (2.7% in the past three years and 1.2% in the past 12 
months)".   
The data of this report are very significant as they refer to facts of corruption happened and 
not to the level of corruption perceived. 
From this report, two measures have been considered: 
1. percentage of households in which at least one component has received in the last three years 
requests for money, favours or gifts in exchange for favours or services, which describes the 
level of corruption in Italian regions; 
2. percentage of persons who have been asked for their vote in exchange for favours, money, and 
gifts at least during one election. This percentage highlights the spread of a specific type of cor-
ruption in the country. Hopkin has defined "the distribution of selective benefits to individuals 
or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support" as political clientelism and following 
this description -although "there is no agreed upon definition for what exactly constitutes cli-
entelism" (Rothstein B. and Varraich A., 2014) - we use this second percentage as a measure of 
the level of clientelism in Italian regions (VOTOSC). 
The following boxplots illustrate the distribution in Italian regions of these two sets of data 
referred to the dependent variables of this study: corruption (CORR2) and clientelism (VOTOSC). As 










Table1: summary statistics 
 
 Corruption Clientelism 
Min 0.300 0.500 
1st quartile 1.100 1.725 
Median 2.300 2.900 
Mean 2.493 3.915 
3rd quartile 3.275 6.175 
Max 6.000 9.700 
 
The regions having the lowest level of corruption (Min=0.300) and clientelism (Min=0.500) 
are respectively Valle d’Aosta and Friuli Venezia Giulia; the regions having the highest level of cor-
ruption (Max=6.00) and clientelism (Max= 9.7) are respectively Abruzzo and Basilicata. At first 
glance, this suggests a different situation between Northern regions and Southern regions. 
However, with further investigations we can observe that the spread of these crimes cannot 
be explained only considering the geographical location of regions. The situation is probably more 
complicated than that described by Yaganeh H. (2014) who has suggested that corruption leads to 
distinguish between "traditional/southern/underdeveloped" countries and "mod-
ern/northern/developed" countries. In fact, there are Northern regions which have a high level of 
corruption (Lombardia 2.4% and Veneto 2.2%) while there are Southern regions which have a low 








2.2 Independent variables description 
 
To construct factors which may explain corruption and clientelism at the regional level, we 
have considered some indicators mainly obtained from the Bes report 2017– The fair and sustaina-
ble well-being in Italy- produced by Istat and referred to the year 2016. 
These indicators are related to social, institutional and economic aspects, which have proven to be 
significant in explaining the level of corruption in the literature. 
 
a) Social factors 
Several studies have found that female participation in government legislatures (Dollar D. et al., 
2001; Branisa B. et al.2013) and a greater representation of women in government or market work 
(Swamy A. et al., 2001), are negatively associated with a higher index of perceived corruption. Alt-
hough Sung H.E. (2003) has suggested that a third factor, liberal democracy, could mediate the re-
lationship between female presence and corruption, Gokcekus O. and Mukherjee R. (2004), focus-
ing on public sector organisations, have demonstrated that the level of corruption would diminish 
with an increase of female presence in organisations, until this presence is lower than that of 
males. These relationships between corruption and gender have been explained considering the 
different propensity to comply to laws (Torgler B. and Valev N. T., 2006) and the distinct aversion of 
being subject to punishment of men and women (Fišar M. et al., 2016), resulting from the "funda-
mental differences at the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural level due to biological, psychologi-
cal, and experiential realities". For Alatas V. et al. (2009) these different attitudes towards corrup-
tion are also linked to the different roles that men and women play in society: in patriarchal socie-
ties where women do not play an active role in public life, their vision is highly influenced by that 
of males. Mocan N. (2008) has also suggested that the involvement of men in acts of corruption, 
can be related to the fact that in different countries, in the labour market males are more active 
than females even though Torgler B. and Valev N. T. (2006, 2010) have not found that equal oppor-
tunities between the two genders reduce these differences. 
To verify whether a more significant presence of females in the public sector may lead to a lower 
level of corruption, we have considered the percentage of women included in the staff in the local 
units of public institutions present in each region (Istat, Permanent census public institutions year 
2015-variable FEMM). We have decided not to consider female presence in politics since this vari-
able is affected by several laws that have tried to implement the principle of gender equality, stat-
ing, for example, that none of the two sexes can be represented more than two-thirds in the lists of 
candidates and that voters can express two preferences provided that they involve candidates of 
different sex. 
Based on the survey conducted by Dotta B. et al. (2013) the analysis of the variable gender has also 
considered the level of education: in fact, the authors, through their study, have highlighted that 
the relationship between gender and corruption can be mediated by that factors, given that coun-
tries, where social institutions inhibit women to participate in social life, are characterised by a 
higher level of corruption, but also by a lower educational level. For this reason, we have analysed 
the following indicators: 
1. People with at least upper secondary education, considering the percentage of people aged 25-
64 years having completed at least high secondary education (ISCED level not below 3a, 3b or 3c) 
on total people aged 25-64 years. (Source: ISTAT-BES 2017-variable SCUOLSEC), 
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2. People with tertiary education, considering the percentage of people aged 30-34 years having 
completed tertiary education (ISCED 5 or 6) on total people aged 30-34 years (Source: ISTAT – BES 
2017-variable TITUNIV). 
 
The further factor considered is social capital, defined as "the productive value of social con-
nections" among individuals (Scrivens K. and Smith C., 2013). While several studies have focused 
the attention on specific components of social capital (Knack S., 2002) as personal relationships, 
social network support, civic engagement or trust (Scrivens K. and Smith C., 2013), Szreter S. 
(2002) has broken down social capital into three constituents: 
1) bonding capital, which "refers to networks formed from perceived, shared identity relations," 
2) bridging capital, which refers to "networks of associations where the differentiating principle of 
shared social identity, similar origins, or status positions in society play no necessary role in de-
termining membership," 
3) linking capital, which includes that part of social capital produced "unintentionally by social ac-
tivities, networks and institutionalised relationships among unequal agents which aim to 
achieve the same goal." 
Some studies have highlighted that while bonding capital may produce negative externalities for 
society whenever it facilitates the creation of individual interdependency and the construction of 
small groups (Lopez J. A. P. and Santos J. M. S., 2014) that could help the development of "amoral 
rent-seeking structures" (López J. A. P. and Santos J. M. S., 2014), bridging capital and linking capital 
are more likely to produce positive externalities for society. Moreover, in societies where there is 
more inequality, bonding capital is more present since, on the one hand, indigent people develop 
inter-generational and kinship-based relationships to obtain support, while, on the other side, 
elites develop relationships only with people who share the same level of wealth or privilege (Szre-
ter S., 2002). Conversely, universalist trust, which is composed by bridging capital and linking capi-
tal, is more present in situations of economic and social equality which ensure identical opportuni-
ties for people. 
Corruption influences and is influenced by social capital. First, corruption may lead to a reduction 
of universalist trust since it reduces confidence and creates social tensions promoting policies for 
income redistribution which, at the end, accentuate inequalities (Rothstein B. and Uslaner E.M., 
2005). At the same time, corruption can be promoted by bonding capital and may be reduced by 
the presence of linking and bridging capital. 
To explore the impact that social capital has on corruption, we have used the following indicators: 
1. to measure the effect of interpersonal relationships we have considered the percentage of 
people aged 14 and over that are very satisfied with family relations, on the total population 
aged 14 and over (Source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable SODRELFAM), and the percentage of peo-
ple aged 14 and over that are very satisfied with relations with friends, on the total population 
aged 14 and over (Source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable SODRELAMIC), 
2. to quantify generalised trust, which refers to individual expectations of confidence and social 
norms underlying collective living that stimulate mutual cooperation in order to promote 
common well-being (Scrivens K. and Smith C., 2013), we have considered the percentage of 
people aged 14 and over feeling that most people are worthy of trust on the total population 
aged 14 and over (Source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable GENTRUST), 
3. to measure political and civic engagement, which refer to all activities through which an indi-
vidual contributes to the community, we have considered the percentage of people aged 14 
and over who performs at least one of the following activities of civic and political participa-
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tion, on the total population aged 14 and over: speaking about politics at least once a week; in-
forming themselves about Italian politics at least once a week; attending online consultation or 
voting on social issues or political issues (e.g., urban planning, signing a petition) at least once 
in the 3 months preceding the interview; reading and posting opinions about social or political 
issues on the web at least once within the 3 months before the interview (source: ISTAT – BES 
2017-variable INTPOLCIV). 
Usually, family and friends' relationships are seen as a harmful component of the social capital 
since there may be a tendency to favour members of the clan in certain situations. Conversely, the 
third indicator, which measures generalised trust, represents a positive component of social capi-
tal. The fourth indicator enables us to check whether more participation is associated with a lower 
level of corruption, as suggested by several authors. 
 
a) Institutional factors 
Corruption is strictly linked to the operating modalities with which institutions carry out 
their duties and make a genuine use of their powers of regulation, authorisation, taxation, and ex-
penditure (Martin K. D. et al., 2007; Jing R. and Graham J.L., 2008; Lalountas D.A. et al., 2011). On 
this point, Klingaard R. (1997) has observed that corruption is a "crime of calculation, not passion" 
and then its distribution is: 
• proportional to the existence of monopoly positions, related to the supply of public goods and 
services, and to the discretional powers of bureaucratic or political authority, 
• inversely related to the transparency of public administration. 
Although, this latter factor has been analysed in various studies (Nguyen T.V. et al., 2017; Zhao H. et 
al., 2017; Timothy C. S. and Danila S., 2017; Bertot J.C. et al., 2010; Berthon P. et al. 2008), we think 
that the capability of transparency to become a powerful deterrent against facts that harm the col-
lective wealth is difficult to investigate since it depends on several intertwined factors (for example 
the political will, civic society demand for information, the institutional capacity, ICT availability). 
Hence, we have examined the effect of institutional factors on corruption considering both the re-
lationship between citizen and institutions and the quality of services provided by the public sec-
tor. 
On the first side, considering that previous studies have shown that experienced corruption and 
perceived corruption have a negative impact on citizens’ trust in public institutions (Lavallée E. et 
al., 2018;  Hakhverdian A. and Mayne Q., 2012; Clausen B. et al., 2011) we have considered the av-
erage score of trust in the judicial system (on a scale from 0 to 10) expressed by people aged 14 
and over (Source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable FISISTGIUD); we think that trust towards this institu-
tion is significant, since it ensures the respect of the law and affirms justice in society. 
Considering that several scholars have shown that corruption is widespread in countries where the 
institutional system is not efficient, the number of civil servants is high (Salinas-Jiménez, 2007; Hira 
A., 2016), poor quality characterises healthcare and education services (Nguyen T.V. et al., 2017) 
and taxation is high since corruption has an adverse effect also on tax revenue  collection of (Ajaz T. 
and Ahmad E., 2010; Del Monte A. and Papagni E., 2001), while, where good governance prevails, 
there is a lower level of corruption and a higher level of economic development (Charron N. et al., 
2014: Kyriacou A.P., 2016), we have considered the quality of services provided by the public sec-
tor. 
Kyriacou A.P. (2016) has explained the relationship good governance-less corrupt institutions con-
sidering that in societies economically more advanced the highest level of education leads to indi-
15 
 
vidualism, which is at the basis of the demand for better government, and which, in these coun-
tries could be met because of the availability of more resources.   
The evaluation of the quality of public sector services has been based on a composite index which 
considers performance for years 2010-2015 related to the number of beds in residential health 
care facilities and social-healthcare units, the number of children who have benefited from munic-
ipal services, the difficulty of access to some services, the irregularity in the distribution of water, 
the places-km offered by public transports and the satisfaction for mobility services (broad meth-
od. Italy 2010 = 100-Variable QUALSERV), 
 
c) Economic factors 
Several studies have found that the level of corruption is linked to the level of economic develop-
ment of countries (Husted B.W., 1999; Lipset S.M. and Lenz G.S., 2000): corruption is usually wide-
spread where an unfair distribution of income prevails and where the level of GDP per capita is 
lower (Kaikati J.G., et al. 2000). 
Cheung H.Y. and Chan A.W.H. (2008) have explained the relationship between corruption and eco-
nomic development considering that in countries characterised by a high GDP per capita people 
perceive more costs associated with the possibility of losing jobs for committing crimes since sala-
ries are higher; moreover, household income leads to a high level of education which is the basis of 
a more responsible behaviour, the possibility of obtaining better-paid jobs and of achieving the ob-
jectives set. 
Several studies have pointed out that while culture explains the level of corruption, the latter ex-
plains countries' economic performance (Davis J.H. and Ruhe J. A, 2003; Sanyal R., 2005; Sanyal R. 
N. and Samanta S. K., 2002; Sanyal, R.N. and Samanta, S.K., 2004). Moreover, societies which are 
characterised by different cultures may have different perceptions of corruption: usually individual-
istic cultures perceive corruption as a tax that discriminates between those who can pay and those 
who cannot, while collectivistic cultures consider corruption as a way to quickly start new activities 
(Dheer R. J. S., 2017). 
The analysis of economic factors includes the following indicators: 
1. the employment rate of the population aged 20-64 years, constructed considering the per-
centage of 20-64-year-old employed on the population of 20-64 years (Source: ISTAT – BES 
2017 – variable OCCUP), 
2. the incidence of employees with low wage jobs, which considers the percentage of employ-
ees with an hourly wage of less than 2/3 of median pay on the total number of employees 
(source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable BASPAG), 
3. per capita adjusted disposable income, which considers the ratio of adjusted household dis-
posable income (inclusive of the value of in-kind services provided by public and non-profit 
institutions) to the total number of residents. (source: ISTAT – BES 2017-variable REDD), 
4. people at risk of poverty, which focuses on the lack of disposable income (and therefore of 
purchasing power) but also reflects the inequality in income distribution. It considers the 
percentage of persons at risk of poverty, with an equivalised income less than, or equal to, 
60% of the median equivalised income (source: ISTAT – BES 2017 - variable POVERT), 
5. severe material deprivation rate, which considers the population living in households that 
pay rents or utility bills and/or lack at least four of these situations: keep the home ade-
quately warm; face unexpected expenses (of 800 euro in 2014); eat meat, fish or a protein 
equivalent; have a week holiday away from home;  have a car; have a washing machine; 




Table 2 presents simple correlation coefficients between corruption and clientelism and the 
indicators we have selected to represent social, institutional and economic factors. It shows that 
correlations are higher for clientelism (VOTOSC) than corruption (CORR2). Among these variables, 
only a high level of education (SCUOLSEC and TITUNIV) and trust in the judiciary system (FIDSISTG) 
seem to be less important in explaining the level of corruption. Conversely, these variables could 
be useful in explaining the level of clientelism. 
Considering economic factors, we can see that the employment rate (OCCUP) and per capi-
ta disposable income (REDD) are negatively related to corruption and clientelism while low wage 
jobs (BASPAG), deprivation rate (DEPRIV) and poverty rate (POVERT) are positively associated with 
corruption and clientelism.   
The literature has suggested that corruption is usually linked to a poor public-sector func-
tioning and poor-quality services, and our data seem to confirm this. The provision by the public 
sector of excellent quality services (QUALSERV) is negatively related to corruption and clientelism. 
Social capital too, measured considering general trust (GENTRUST), satisfaction with family 
(SODDRELFAM) and friends' relationships (SODDRELAMIC) and civic and political engagement 
(INTPOLCIV), is negatively related to corruption. The unexpected relationship is that referred to sat-
isfaction in family relationships (SODDRELFAM), since it seems not to represent a measure of bond-
ing capital as it is negatively related to corruption. We justify this situation considering that proba-
bly nepotism or other types of favouritism are possible only for families with a high social status 
(and then just in few cases since power and wealth are very concentrated in Italy. Oxfam report has 
shown that in 2016, 1% of the wealthiest population held 25% of the national net wealth in the 
country). Then, only links with essential people may lead to find a good job or to satisfy specific 
needs.   
Finally, a relevant presence of females in the administrative apparatus (FEMM) and the 
presence of well-educated citizens (SCUOLSEC and TITUNIV) are negatively related to corruption 
and clientelism; however, the correlation between the level of education and corruption is very 
low while the percentage of people with upper secondary school is negatively and highly correlat-
ed with clientelism. 
 
Usually correlation values of at least 0.4 are interpreted as indicating multicollinearity prob-
lems. Using Principal component Analysis and Factor Analysis (EFA) with Varimax rotation we have 
created explanatory factors which are not affected by this problem.
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Table 2– Pearsons’ correlation coefficients 
 
 OCCUPAZ BASPAG REDD POVERT DEPRIV FIDSISTG QUALSERV SODDRELFAM SODDRELAM GENTRUST INTPOLCIV FEMM SCUOLSEC TITUNIV CORR2 
BASPAG -0.956               
REDD 0.956 -0.936              
POVERT -0.958 0.898 -0.914             
DEPRIV -0.847 0.836 -0.767 0.826            
FIDSISTG -0.618 0.596 -0.469 0.641 0.735           
QUALSERV 0.935 -0.934 0.927 -0.883 -0.805 -0.575          
SODDREL-
FAM 
0.820 -0.835 0.846 -0.787 -0.639 -0.517 0.872         
SOD-
DRELAM 
0.830 -0.853 0.839 -0.744 -0.657 -0.430 0.848 0.924        
GENTRUST 0.682 -0.733 0.709 -0.626 -0.538 -0.106 0.710 0.572 0.699       
INTPOLCIV 0.902 -0.883 0.854 -0.901 -0.815 -0.734 0.849 0.729 0.687 0.482      
FEMM 0.860 -0.817 0.832 -0.823 -0.637 -0.570 0.813 0.801 0.694 0.459 0.736     
SCUOLSEC 0.826 -0.769 0.742 -0.773 -0.707 -0.459 0.708 0.577 0.620 0.553 0.696 0.660    
TITUNIV 0.598 -0.484 0.441 -0.504 -0.675 -0.553 0.432 0.293 0.346 0.211 0.469 0.537 0.741   
CORR2 -0.617 0.592 -0.626 0.585 0.510 0.217 -0.624 -0.598 -0.627 -0.531 -0.467 -0.610 -0.342 -0.161  
VOTOSC -0.866 0.803 -0.885 0.853 0.783 0.511 -0.824 -0.719 -0.679 -0.527 -0.773 -0.747 -0.722 -0.486 0.631 
 
OCCUP:  employment rate of population aged 20-34 years; BASPAG: incidence of employees with low wage jobs; REDD: per capita adjusted disposable income;  POVERT: peo-
ple at risk of poverty; DEPRIV: severe material deprivation rate; FIDSISTG: trust in the judicial system; QUALSERV: quality of public sector services; SODDRELFAM: percentage of 
people aged 14 and over that are very satisfied with family relations; SODDRELAM: percentage of people aged 14 and over that are very satisfied with relations  with friends; 
GENTRUST: generalised trust measured by the percentage of people aged 14 and over feeling that more people are worthy of trust; INPOLCIV: percentage of people aged 14 
and over who perform certain activities of civic and political participation ; FEMM: percentage of women included in the staff in the local units of public institutions; 




a) Independent variables construction 
 
Using the principal component analysis (PCA), we have tried to reduce the set of variables 
in our dataset, i.e. we have verified whether we could combine our primary variables to derive 
components which produce a synthesis of the initial dataset, capturing the maximum possible in-
formation or variation of our independent variables. Analysing the interrelationship among many 
variables, we have found that four components allow us to explain 0.89% of the total variability.   
Table 3 – Principal component analyses: variance explained by the first four components 
 Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 Comp 4 
Standard deviation 3.1247517 1.2132731 0.89585650 0.73753867 
Proportion of Variance 0.6974338 0.1051451 0.05732563 0.03885452 
Cumulative proportion 0.6974338 0.8025789 0.85990455 0.89875907 
 
Then, Factor analysis technique has been used to identify latent factors with the aim to 
build a linear regression model to appreciate how each one of these variables impacts on corrup-
tion or clientelism. Considering the results of PCA we have sought for four latent variables, which 
could be useful in explaining corruption and clientelism dynamics. 
The following factor matrix (table C) shows loadings referred to each factor. These are the 
results of a Varimax rotation to ensure that the latent variables are orthogonal. This eliminates 
problems of multicollinearity in our regression analysis. 
 
 
Table 4- Factor matrix 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
OCCUP 0.710 0.438 0.387 0.387 
BASPAG -0.695 -0.473 -0.394 -0.264 
REDD 0.766 0.503 0.251 0.247 
POVERT -0.705 -0.387 -0.462 -0.272 
DEPRIV -0.480 -0.276 -0.546 -0.466 
FIDSISTG  -0.223 -0.926 -0.290 
QUALSERV 0.659 0.549 0.372 0.214 
SODRELFAM 0.420 0.851 0.293  
SODRELAM 0.500 0.754 0.189 0.178 
GENTRUST 0.729 0.624  0.114 
INTPOLCIV 0.632 0.313 0.604 0.211 
FEMM 0.494 0.539 0.338 0.356 
SCUOLSEC 0.548 0.271 0.193 0.630 
TITUNIV 0.126  0.272 0.948 
Variance explained by factors 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
SS loading 4.660 3.113 2.590 2.221 
Proportion Var 0.333 0.222 0.185 0.159 
Cumulative Var 0.333 0.555 0.740 0.899 
 
The first factor aggregates data concerning social and economic well-being. It includes as-
pects related to economic well-being (employment, salary and poverty) and those social aspects of 
life strictly depend on it. For example, the quality of services is related to the availability of public 




trust, usually, is higher when the level of education is higher, and the possibility to access educa-
tion is strictly related to household income. The same is true for civic engagement: it raises with 
the level of education, which depends on household income. 
Factor 2 is related to social capital, since the main components are the level of satisfaction 
of family or friends' relationships and the presence of females in the public sector. This latter factor 
refers to linking capital which includes relationships developed unintentionally through social activ-
ities, institutionalised relationships among unequal agents which aim to achieve the same goal. 
The third factor considers citizens' capability to control and question public power. It re-
quires civic-mindedness, and then it is positively related to citizens' political and civic engagement 
since this enhances the capability to understand institutional behaviours and to make citizens' 
voices heard. However, it is also related (negatively) to trust in institutions, that "occurs when citi-
zens' experience with institutions is coherent with their expectations concerning the values and 
norms that surround them" (Filgueiras F., 2013). While governments’ good performance and the 
provision of good quality services lead to more trust in public institutions reducing citizens' control, 
"Deprivation, social injustice and corruption feed distrust towards political institutions” (Wallace C. 
and Latcheva R., 2006). Nevertheless, in a situation of deprivation, citizens do not have the possi-
bility to question public powers or to control them, and sometimes violate social rules (Wallace C. 
and Latcheva R., 2006) as a form of social protest. 
Factor four refers to education. Formal education affects corruption in several ways: first, it 
leads to a high civic duty, reducing corruption; secondly, it enhances political engagement (Marien 
S. et al., 2010) and political knowledge affecting citizens' awareness of institutional good or bad 
practices. Consequently, it influences trust in institutions (Filgueiras F., 2013; Wallace C. and 
Latcheva R., 2006). Hakhverdian A. and Mayne Q. (2012) have found that well-educated citizens 
exhibit more political trust but only when corruption is not widespread. When corruption rises, in-
stitutional trust decreases both among the highest and lowest well-educated groups, but the de-
cline is most significant among the highest well-educated.   
 
2.3 Hypothesis and methodology 
 
Considering these four factors and the findings of the previous studies listened above, we 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H1: The level of corruption is lower where social well-being is higher, 
H2: The level of corruption is lower where social capital is higher, 
H3: The level of corruption is lower where citizens’ capability to control and question public power 
is higher, 
H4: The level of corruption is lower where the level of education is higher 
 
H5: The level of clientelism is lower where social well-being is higher, 
H6: The level of clientelism is lower where social capital is higher, 
H7: The level of clientelism is lower where citizens’ capability to control and question public power 
is higher, 
H8: The level of clientelism is lower where the level of education is higher 
 
Hence, using OLS method, in a first model the level of corruption was regressed on the ex-
planatory variables related to social and economic well-being, social capital, control that citizens 
exert over education and education; in a second model the level of clientelism was regressed on 
the explanatory variables related to social and economic well-being, social capital, control that citi-







The impact of our four factors on corruption and clientelism is shown in the following table 
detailing the results of the two regressions. The two models allow us to identify the impact of each 
factor on the level of corruption or clientelism in each region. The models were run from the 
scores established in the above factor analysis. 
In the first model, only social-economic well-being and social capital are statistically signifi-
cant (supporting hypotheses H1 and H2), while in the second model all our variables are statistical-
ly significant (supporting hypotheses H5, H6, H7, H8). The Multiple R-squared of 0,46 in the first 
model shows that approximately only 46% of the variation of corruption is explained by our model 
while Multiple R-squared of 0.76 referred to the second model shows that about 76% of the varia-
bility of clientelism is explained by economic-social well-being, social capital, citizens' control over 
institutions and education. 
 
Table 5: Beta values for corruption 
 
Predictors Coefficients Standard error t value 
Intercept 2.49250*** 0.29806    8.362 
Social and economic well-
being 
-0.87656** 0.30910   -2.836    
Social capital -0.65499* 0.30873   -2.122    
Citizens' control -0.13576 0.30720   -0.442    
Formal education -0,06433 0.30701   -0.210    
Multiple R-squared 0.464 
Notes: * Parameter is significant at 0.05 level 
** Parameter is significant at 0.01 level 








Table 6: Beta values for clientelism 
 
Predictors Coefficients Standard error t value 
Intercept 3.9150 *** 0.3467   11.294 
Social and economic well-
being 
-1.8376*** 0.3595   -5.112 
Social capital -1.0671*** 0.3591   -2.972 
Citizens' control -0.8916** 0.3573   -2.496 
Formal education -0.8495** 0.3571   -2.379 
Multiplw R-squared 0.76 
 
Notes: * Parameter is significant at 0.05 level 
** Parameter is significant at 0.01 level 








Clientelism= 3,9150 -1,8376*Well-being – 1,0671*Socapital -0,8916*Citizcontrol – 0,8495* Formaleduc 
 
We can notice that all our factors are negatively related to corruption and clientelism since 
the signs of coefficients are negative; this means that high scores of social-economic well-being 
and social capital are associated to low ratings of corruption and clientelism, and high scores of cit-
izens' control over institutions and high levels of education are associated to low scores of clien-
telism. 
Social and economic well-being has the strongest explanatory power of corruption and cli-
entelism in Italian regions. A situation of economic well-being which leads to more education, po-
litical and civic engagement, more trust in institutions and the availability of good quality services 
is associated to a low level of corruption. Conversely, corruption and clientelism seem to raise in 
situations in which there are, on the one hand, some needs to satisfy and, on the other side, some 
persons who can exploit the situation to reinforce their power. A condition of social wellbeing 
guarantees personal fulfilment, and there is no need to accept the change. 
Social capital too affects both corruption and clientelism. In fact, Szreter S. (2002) has 
stressed that the decline of civic engagement and the deterioration in the prestige of government, 
which characterises the recent decade, are accompanied by a reduction of bridging and linking 
capital. This situation is the consequence of increasing unsatisfied needs of the population (which 
in Italy is probably strictly related to crises) and the reduction of social intervention (linked also to 
the lack of public resources available) which have led a critical mass of citizens to cease in believing 
that their governments are responsive to their concerns and wishes.  Satisfaction in family and 
friend's relationships seem not to have negative externalities for society in Italy, probably because 
the social status of the family plays a fundamental role: in many situations family and friends can 
only provide moral support or a limited material help, but they cannot solve radically problems (as, 
unemployment). Furthermore, we think that the prevalence of social capital components (bonding 
rather than bridging capital) is affected by two cultural determinants: individualism and masculini-
ty. Following Hofstede's model, individualism is high in the country, but this high value accompa-
nied by a high value in masculinity, probably leads people to pursue their interest without consid-
ering the public asset, so that they sustain politicians even if they commit crimes when they can 
gain directly from the situation. 
Other two factors are linked to clientelism: citizens’ control over institutions and the level of 
education. 
Citizens' control is not required in a situation in which there are good quality services, good 
institutions and good examples set by politicians, but it raises when there is no trust in the func-
tioning of the judicial system although the capability of citizens to react is linked to their economic 
and social position. The aptitude to control and question institutional behaviour is negatively relat-
ed to deprivation since in that situation the possibility to react is limited by the lack of resources or, 
sometimes, by the lack of knowledge, due to a low level of education. Moreover, the cultural de-
terminant of power distance can affect citizens' reactions, so that people leaving in a situation of 
deprivation can reply to abuse recurring to law violation as a form of social protest, considering 
impossible to obtain the respect of law from more powerful people. 
Formal education is negatively related to clientelism, on the one hand because usually edu-
cation is associated with civic-mindedness, and, on the other hand, because with a higher level of 
education people can achieve their goals without recurring to this type of crime. 
Clientelism seems to be not only a corruption manifestation but also a factor that stimulates cor-
ruption: in fact, it could favour bribes to finance pork-barrel (Golden M., 2000, 2003), or it could 




change the way people see things, since it provides a bad example of conduct and an easier way to 
achieve power. 
The linear relationship between corruption and clientelism is confirmed by Pearson correla-
tions as shown in the following table. 
 
Table 7: Measuring the relationship between corruption and clientelism 
 





In the light of the fact that culture has a significant impact on the level of corruption in a 
country, considering previous studies we have examined the link between cultural determinants 
and corruption. Considering studies based on Hofstede's model of cultural analysis, it appears that 
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity are the cultural determinants most frequently 
associated with a high rate of corruption. 
Taking in reference Italy, a country characterised by a high level of corruption not equally 
distributed among regions, based on the findings related to studies following Hofstede’s model of 
cultural analysis we have suggested that there are some cultural features which may explain the 
high level of corruption: the importance for people to reach a successful position (high masculini-
ty); the excessive regulation that would determine the opacity of the regulatory system, its ineffec-
tiveness and the consequent possibility of maintaining unethical conduct unpunished (high uncer-
tainty avoidance); short-term orientation, which would lead to achieve the utmost usefulness in a 
short time. Considering the model of House B. et al. (2004), which highlights the existence of a 
substantial deviation between some values and practices in the country, also the high values in 
power distance and institutional collectivism and the low values of human orientation and perfor-
mance orientation, seem to motivate the high level of corruption. Moreover, discrepancies be-
tween values and practices related to future orientation would be an indicator of the presence of 
arbitrary corruption. 
While these cultural features contribute to creating a breeding ground for corruption, some 
other factors must explain the variability of this crime at the regional level. Considering the find-
ings of previous studies, we have identified some social, institutional and cultural factors which are 
linked to corruption and then constructed independent variables potentially related to corruption.   
Using the multiple linear regressions model, we have analysed, in a first model, the rela-
tionship between these variables and corruption, and, in a second model, the relationship be-
tween these variables and a specific type of corruption, clientelism. Regressions have shown that 
socio-economic well-being and social capital are the most critical factors linked to a high level of 
corruption and clientelism. This means that, a situation of economic hardship and a problematic 
social condition (fewer resources available within a family imply less education and consequently 
fewer chances to find an employment, as well as less participation in social and political life and 
then lower power of citizens' to question political conduct and to demand good governance) are 
linked to greater corruption, suggesting that the latter may depend on a situation of precarious-
ness that leads to acting unethically to meet the needs or, in the case of clientelism, allows some-
one to leverage that situation to achieve their goals. Social capital and specifically the positive 
components of linking capital and bridging capital contribute to explain further the corruption rate 
found at the regional level. The inability to obtain support from other members of the community 




to the acceptance of non-licit solutions to problems and to take an individualistic vision that re-
moves the importance of the respect of the rules of collective living. 
In relation to the dependent variable clientelism, which for Golden M. (2000, 2003) is strict-
ly linked to the Italian system of vote preference, two additional explanatory variables have been 
identified: 
1. the capability of citizens to react to crimes and question public powers, which is low in a situa-
tion of strong material deprivation associated with the absence of forms of protection for the most 
vulnerable, and when there is trust in the judicial system, since in that case citizens’ intervention is 
not required; 
2. the low level of education, as a higher educational level is linked to a greater possibility of find-
ing employment, having an income and satisfying personal expectations as well as to a higher po-
litical and civic engagement, which stress the importance to comply to rules. 
Considering the findings referred to the variable clientelism, we speculate that the same repre-
sents not only a specific type of corruption but also its cause, for at least three reasons: 
1. as Golden M. (2000, 2003) has stressed, politicians use two mechanisms to obtain the support of 
citizens: pork barrel legislation and political patronage. Both are aimed to capture vote preferences 
during elections; but this distribution of economic benefits, stimulates, as a result, an illegal provi-
sion of resources by political parties and politicians. In fact, Golden M. (2000, 2003) has pointed 
out that "sometimes incentives are provided using bribes paid by firms doing business with the 
public sector," 
2. patronage or the provision of other individual advantages by politicians would entail a state of 
awe of those who have received benefits by politicians, so that it may be required to keep silent 
about the crimes they have become aware of or to take an active part in their commission for the 
role they play in the administrative machine. In fact, in Italy, policy and administration are divided: 
politicians can only identify goals to be achieved, while the administrative component is responsi-
ble for the fulfilment of actions needed to achieve these objectives. Then, usually crimes require 
the involvement of the administrative apparatus, and those who have been hired by politicians are 
trapped to do what is expected of them. Then, sometimes grand corruption may promote bureau-
cratic corruption, 
3. the negative example provided by the political party, which retains several privileges also in a 
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Whistleblowing in the Italian public sector:  






Whistleblowing refers to the disclosure, by organisational members, of mismanagement or corruption, to 
persons or organisations who can act and correct such wrongdoing. It is a type of internal control which can 
be a good governance practice if implemented effectively. 
Italian anti-corruption law no. 190 of 2012, has introduced whistleblowing in the public sector as a corrup-
tion prevention tool and this paper tries to evaluate factors affecting reporting and, more broadly, the effec-
tiveness of whistleblowing in fighting corruption and maladministration in the country. 
Since people and organisations are not willing to talk about their unethical behaviour, studies are usually 
based on intentions to blow the whistle. But it has been demonstrated that the findings of these researches 
cannot be translated into conclusions about actual whistleblowing. 
This study considers actual whistleblowing, since it is based on quantitative analyses of data obtained from 
the examination of statements of the Anticorruption Officers’ and National Anti-corruption Authority’s an-
nual monitoring on whistleblowing, and on qualitative analyses referred to clarifications obtained through 
interviews in public administrations and the National Anticorruption Authority. 
In Italian public administrations, whistleblowing in 2016 has been rarely used by civil servants to report 
wrongdoings. However, the number of reports received by public bodies increase with the size of the organi-
sation and when the channels, used to report wrongdoings, ensure better confidentiality. Although in those 
administrations in which ethical behaviour prevails, direct communication is preferred to formal communica-
tion channels by both civil servants and Anti-corruption officials, some constraints limit the capability to cre-
ate effective reporting channels. Moreover, L. 190/2012 has not significantly extended the protection for re-






1. Italian anti-corruption policies: a component of an international trend 
The possibility that corruption can influence the economies of different countries has led, since the 
1990s, to the development of supranational contrast measures and to several agreements (Canestri D., 
2014). 
Although generally criticised as a source of isomorphism (Di Maggio P.J. and Powell W.W., 1983; 
Hassink H. et al., 2007; Pillay S. et al., 2017), the application of international standards and rules driven by 
external checks, which have the possibility to highlight deficiencies and support the alignment process, has 
been particularly important (Parisi N., 2016) in Italy. 
In fact, the implementation of article 6 of the United Nations Convention against corruption (adopt-
ed by the General Assembly on 31 October 2003) and of articles 20 and 21 of the Criminal Law Convention 
on corruption (signed in Strasbourg on 27 January 1999), has led to the introduction of law (6 November 




lic administration", representing the first attempt to pursue a systematic fight against corruption in the 
country. 
The international approach, brought into action by law no. 190 of 2012, involves the following as-
pects. 
1. An extension of the corruption concept, to include not only cases concerning the Criminal Code, but 
also situations of maladministration resulting from the use of a public function for private purposes. 
2. The introduction of a system of instruments to fight corruption based on the development of a National 
Anti-corruption Plan at the central level and the adoption of Three-year Plans in every peripheral public 
administration. 
3. The creation of a network of actors operating in a coordinated manner and on different institutional 
levels to reduce opportunities for corruption and to increase the ability to uncover cases of 
maladministration. The National Anti-Corruption Authority (NAA)3 is the central node of this network, 
while Anti-corruption Officers4 (Aos) are the main peripheral nodes, who link all the actors operating in 
individual administrations (Pilato S., 2015). 
4. The adoption, not only of repressive measures based on the application of criminal law to fight 
corruption but also of administrative measures aimed at preventing it (Parisi N., 2016). 
These preventative measures against corruption include the introduction of a protection for civil 
servants who report offences learned during the performance of their activities: the so-called whistleblow-
ing.  
In fact, corruption is usually explained as a consequence of asymmetric information and power. Re-
ferring to the principal agent-client model, several authors have highlighted that corruption can raise since 
elected officials (principals), for the delivery of services to citizens, employ public administrators (agents), 
who, knowing more about administration than the principals and the clients, can exploit their position to 
pursue their personal interest instead of the public one. Whistleblowing can reduce the information asym-
metry, since it activates an internal control mechanism based on the employees’ privileged standpoint in-
side the organisation. Indeed, in the assumption that organisations are composed by agents, pursuing their 
selfish interest, but also by stewards, whose interests are aligned to those of the public, the whistleblowing 
mechanism promotes the disclosure by stewards of mismanagement by supervisors or peers, providing 
them with a protection from retaliation. 
Their reporting to actors who can correct these wrongdoings has two objectives: 
1. avoiding the continuation of unlawful conduct by sanctioning the perpetrators,  
2. preventing corruption, not only because the possibility of being denounced and punished lead to 
reduced misconduct but also since employees’ reports should allow the recipient (Aos) to adopt 
appropriate organisational measures avoiding the risk that wrongdoings (which have been reported) 
will be repeated in the future.  
Andrade J.A. (2015) has defined whistleblowers as “ethical boundaries” of organisations, because 
they contribute to the building of trust between the organisation and their stakeholders. Public administra-
tions are the main beneficiaries of whistleblowing, since the latter can: 
1. improve their image, increasing public confidence, by pursuing directly the corrupt subjects and making 
it possible to create a distinction between honest and dishonest employees, 
2. recover unduly subtracted funds and stimulate an efficient use of the resources available, given that 
                                                          
3 The National Anti-corruption authority is an administrative authority composed of five members, whose purpose is the 
prevention of corruption within the Italian public sector. It incorporates functions and personnel from the Authority for 
the Supervision of Public Contracts for Works, Services and Supplies (AVCP) and from the Commission for the 
Evaluation, Transparency and Integrity of Government (CIVIT). 
4 Anti-corruption officers are high-ranking civil servants appointed in each public administration to develop, using risk-
based analyses, a Three-year plan to prevent corruption. They are liable for the implementation of this plan and may face 





maladministration can be discovered and punished. 
At a first glance, the introduction of whistleblowing policy into organisations seem an easy task. In-
deed, it requires only the following components: 
1. effective channels to communicate wrongdoings (Ponemon L. A., 1994), which can be internal or 
external, since sometimes external parties have resources that organisations do not have, to stop and 
correct wrongdoing, 
2. a reward or a protecting structure for whistleblowers: although several studies have warned that a 
reward structure may lead to frivolous complaints (Ponemon L. A., 1994; Brink A.G. et al., 2013; Boo E. 
et al., 2016), sometimes it is an important tool to promote whistleblowing as it provides the 
employee’s protection against retaliation, 
3. a reply to whistleblowers’ complaints since their aim is to obtain an organisational change. 
Consequential measures and administration support to whistleblowers may encourage other 
interventions and then increase the level of ethical behaviour among employees also because there is a 
higher chance of getting caught. 
Considering that the power decentralisation processes, the weakness of external control systems and the 
proliferation of illegal ways of pursuing economic objectives promoted by the crisis in recent decades have 
stressed the importance of whistleblowing as a component of public administration’s governance systems, 
this paper tries to highlight the factors that stimulated Italian civil servants’ allegations during 2016. The 
analysis of data collected over a year, does not allow us to verify results obtained by the introduction of the 
rule in the long run; nevertheless, it offers some suggestions about the poor results obtained by L. 190/2012 
and the reasons that have stimulated legislative changes in the following few years.  
To this end, the remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the second section describes whis-
tleblowing protection in force in 2016; the third section reviews the principal findings of the existing litera-
ture on whistleblowing determinants to develop hypotheses; the fourth section illustrates the hypotheses,  
the data used for the analysis, the sample and the evaluation methodology; section five describes the re-
sults of the quantitative analysis; in section six we illustrate whistleblowing mechanisms, we provide clarifi-
cations on their functioning considering what has been reported by those we have interviewed and we ana-
lyse  problems that have come to light; in section seven we draw our conclusions. 
 
2. A first protection for the whistleblower  
In Italy, a plurality of rules set out the duty for certain employees to disclose facts or behaviours det-
rimental to public finances to the Accounting Public Prosecutor. However, before the entry into force of law 
no. 190 of 2012 there wasn’t any specific legal protection in favour of the employee who disclosed tort, alt-
hough on several occasions the Court had considered employees’ complaints about crimes committed by 
the employer, not as a breach of the duty of obedience, nor of the obligation of loyalty to the company, de-
claring the illegality of disciplinary measures adopted by the employer (Liguori G., 2015). 
Including article 54-a (Protection of employees who report abuses) in Legislative Decree no. 165 of 
30 March 2001 (General Labour Law Standards employed by public administrations), article 1 paragraph 51 
of law no. 190 of 2012 has introduced, for the first time, a protection for whistleblowers in the Italian legis-
lation. This article was supplemented during the year 2014 (by article 19 paragraph 5 and by article 31 of 
Decree-Law no. 90 entered into force on 24 June 2014 - converted with law no. 114 on 11 August 2014) in 
order to add the National Anti-corruption Authority (NAA) among those who are authorised to receive re-
ports from employees of other administrations considering its supervisory functions.  
It was also amended at the end of the year 2017 by the introduction of L. 178 (“Provisions for the 
protection of authors of reports related to offences or irregularities learned in the context of a public or pri-




troduction of the whistleblowing policy. However, since this paper takes into account administrative data 
referring to the year 2016, changes made by law 178/2017 are not considered. 
Thus, referring to the rules in force in 2016, we can observe, first of all, that the initial protection 
granted to whistleblowers was subject to several limitations. Firstly, it was extended only to the sphere of 
public administrations (article 54-a referred to administrations of article 2 paragraph 1 of the same legisla-
tive decree)5; secondly, it was referred only to civil servants, excluding other subjects working in the public 
sector such as consultants or service providers, for example.  Thirdly, whistleblower protection covered only 
situations related to wrongdoings learned by employees during the execution of their functions in the or-
ganisation or, regarding their generic inclusion in the organisational context (Jannone A., 2016). These 
wrongdoings could refer to: 
1. crimes against public administrations as regulated by title II, section I of the Criminal Code (bribery for 
the exercise of the function, corruption for breach of administrative duties and corruption in judicial 
proceedings, under articles 318, 319 and 319-ter of the Criminal Code), 
2. abuse of power to obtain private benefits, 
3. use of attributed functions for private purposes. 
The protection offered to whistleblowers was achieved in two ways: 
1. a guarantee of confidentiality specified in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the article, 
2. a prohibition of discrimination contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the same article. 
Such protection, however, did not work in cases of liability under libel or defamation, or in cases of reports 
that indicate false information made with intent or gross negligence. It consisted in: 
1. ensuring identity confidentiality by administrations, upon receipt and at any later stage of the complaint 
management. However, this rule in practice contained relevant limitations: 
a) within the same disciplinary procedure, since when the dispute giving rise to the proceedings was 
based solely on whistleblowers’ reporting and the knowledge of his/her identity was necessary for 
the defence of the accused, the whistleblower’s identity could be revealed to the Disciplinary 
Procedures Office and to the accused; 
b) in the situations in which allegations have a criminal profile, since the code of criminal procedure 
does not provide confidentiality forms for criminal proceedings (under article 335 c.p.p. the 
complainant can be made known and, with the related filing, in accordance with article 415-a c.p.p., 
documents become public), 
2. excluding from the right to access the whistleblower’s complaint, pursuant to article 1 paragraph 24 
lett. a) of law no.241/1990. 
The prohibition of discrimination was related to the fact that employees who alleged misconduct, could not 
be sanctioned or fired and they were kept free by direct or indirect discriminatory measures, influencing 
their working conditions, adopted for reasons related to the complaint. The possible adoption of discrimina-
tory measures could, in fact, be communicated by the employee or by one of the most representative trade 
unions in the administration, to the Department of Public Function. The employee might also proceed with 
legal action to obtain, from Administrative Regional Court, a judicial emergency measure aimed at the ces-
sation of the discriminatory acts or the cancellation of any unlawful administrative measure taken by the 
administration with the compensation for asset losses and non-pecuniary damages suffered because of the 
discrimination. 
                                                          
5 According to article 2, paragraph 1 of legislative decree no. 165/2001, the term Public Administration includes all State 
administrations, institutes and schools of all levels and educational institutions, companies, autonomous public 
administrations, Regions, Provinces, Municipalities, mountain communities and their consortia and associations, higher 
education institutions, Independent public housing institutions, Chambers of Commerce, industry, Handicraft and 
Agriculture and their associations, all non-economic public bodies at the national, regional and local level, authorities, 





To encourage employees to blow the whistle, the rule provided two channels of communication: 
one internal to the organisation and one external. Reporting within the organisation should have been di-
rected to the immediate superior even though the NAA in its guidelines (determination no. 6 of 28 April 
2015) suggested to send reports to the Anti-corruption officer (Ao) for two reasons. On the one side, he/she 
has the capability to take appropriate measures aimed at strengthening the administration’s Plan to Prevent 
Corruption and, on the other side, to overcome any problem related to the existence of multiple hierar-
chical levels that in some cases might lead to difficulties in ensuring the protection of the whistleblower’s 
identity. In addition, reports could be addressed to external authorities: the NAA, the Court of Auditors and 
the other Courts in charge. 
However, art. 54-a simply provided a general and abstract protection in favour of a civil servant to 
prevent the omission of reports regarding any misconduct to avoid harmful consequences (Jannone A., 
2016). In fact, further measures had to be adopted by all public administrations and by Aos, to ensure real 
protection for employees. Following the NAA guidelines, public administrations were required to adopt a 
system including organisational and technological interconnected measures for the management of reports. 
More precisely, each administration had to: 
1. regulate the procedures for complaint management, defining stages and actors playing a role in the 
process and training civil servants to inform them on protections offered and to spread ethical values 
with the aim of supporting a new administrative culture, 
2. adopt systems permitting the identification of the reporting agent with separation between information 
identifying the whistleblowers and the content of the report.  
L. 190/2012, however, did not provide for the criminal liability for the employer who impeded re-
ports to competent authorities, the liability for retaliatory acts committed by work colleagues or incentives 
in favour of the whistleblower. Economic incentives were perceived by the doctrine as a wrong way, which 
would increase complaints, without considering benefits for the community when maladministration or cor-
ruption are uncovered and, without considering economic risks, legal fees and health costs that too often 
whistleblowers suffer (Gargano G., 2016). 
 
3. Whistleblowing determinants: a literature review 
 
Previous studies suggest that several factors may affect the employees’ decision to blow the whis-
tle. The following review of the literature considers the main factors affecting whistleblowing, by grouping 
them, for simplification, in three main categories: 
1) factors acting at the individual level, 
2) factors involving the organisation, 
3) factors related to the external environment. 
 
1)Factors acting at the individual level  
Employees’ willingness to report wrongdoings may depend on their personality, their knowledge and expe-
rience, the status and position held in the organisation, their perception of the organisational situation and 
their emotions. 
Dozier J.B. and Miceli M.P., (1985) have suggested that whistleblowing is the result of certain stable 
personality characteristics of employees and of their perception of the organisational situation. In this vein, 
some studies have shown that whistleblowers are employees with a high degree of loyalty towards the 
company since they act in accordance with firms’ interest (Larmer R., 1992), and that they usually are low 
Machs, since they are not motivated by self-interest and do not try to manipulate situations to achieve 
their objectives (Dalton D. and Radtke R., 2013). Vadera A.K. et al. (2009) have also suggested that the de-
cision to blow the whistle depends on the interaction between employees' moral identity and other identi-
ties which have moral components, and which are organised in a personal "salience hierarchy".  
However, since whistleblowing entails the discovery of wrongdoings, employees’ experience and 




training and whistleblowing programs can incentivise reports since they develop employees’ awareness of 
inappropriate activities and subsequent responsibilities (MacGregor J. and Stuebs M., 2014). 
The decision to blow the whistle is also affected by the employees’ status and positions held in the 
organisation. Employees’ reports are more frequent when they hold a high status in the organisation (Miceli 
M.P. and Near J.P., 1988, 1984), since it leads to a lower level of dependence on the organisation(Keenan 
J.P., 2002), and, at the same time, to a high level of credibility which increases the likelihood to obtain a re-
action from their organisation (Near J.P. and Miceli M.P., 1995). The effectiveness of reporting is also en-
hanced when employees hold positions in which whistleblowing is role-prescribed, although in that case, 
Chung J. et al. (2004), it has been found that the most important factor is the position held by the wrong-
doer, since employees are more likely to blow the whistle when the latter has less power in the organisa-
tion.  
Whistleblowing may be the result of a rational decision or of an emotional reaction. 
In the first case, the decision to blow the whistle depends on the individuals’ causal analyses of perceived 
wrongdoings and their subjective evaluation of consequences (Gundlach M. I. et al., 2003). In that case, 
organizational support and protection contribute in enhancing whistleblowing intention by reducing per-
ceived personal costs (Cho Y.J. and Song H.J., 2015). However, sometimes subordinates express a higher 
willingness to report unethical behaviour since they are less concerned about the potential consequences 
they may experience by reporting unethical conduct (Wright B. E. et al., 2016).   
Nevertheless, sometimes whistleblowing represents an emotional reaction: in fact, Henik E. (2015) 
has demonstrated that external whistleblowing is linked to motivations derived by extra-organizational 
principles matched to anger over retaliation following internal reports. 
2) factors involving the organisation 
At the organizational level, the creation of an appropriate climate and culture, the ethical behaviour of 
managers or supervisors, the support of a reward or penalty system and the availability of channels to re-
port may enhance whistleblowing. 
In fact, to boost the effectiveness of whistleblowing, it is important to favour an organizational cli-
mate which discourages wrongdoings, encourages whistleblowing, and discourages retaliation against whis-
tleblowers (Near J.P. and Miceli M.P., 1995).  This can be achieved more easily underlining the importance 
of principles in employees‘ethical decisions, than through a climate which emphasizes the need to comply 
with rules (Chung J. et al., 2004).  
The ethical culture of an organisation is important as well, in encouraging whistleblowing (Near J.P. 
and Miceli M.P., 1995). An organisational culture based on vigilance, engagement, credibility, accountabil-
ity, empowerment and courage, and which offers different options for disclosure is very effective in en-
couraging employees to blow the whistle (Berry B., 2004). Conversely, cultures that normalise wrongdoings 
increase a ‘‘logic of corruption’’ that may be disruptive (Miceli M.P. et al.,2009). A long-term process is re-
quired to change this logic, re-addressing identities and practices (Misangyi V.F. et al., 2008); sometimes, 
whistleblowers could make the first step in this changing process but clarity, supportability, discussability, 
and sanctionability are particularly relevant in encouraging employees to take positive action (Kaptein M., 
2011).  
Moreover, managers or supervisors’ ethical behaviour plays an important role in determining the 
ethical conduct of employees in the organisation. On the one hand, managers or supervisors who behave 
ethically usually select and retain employees who behave in the same way. On the other hand, managers 
or supervisors’ values are usually emulated by employees’ (Wright B. E. et al., 2016), so that when top 
managers stress the importance of the employees’ ethical behaviour, employees engage in Organizational 
Citizen Behaviour (Holmes S.A. et al., 2002) and will denounce wrongdoings. 
Trust in supervisors, managers’ support to whistleblowers, organisational justice and response to 
complaints are very important to raise the witnesses’ intentions to report, and they can reduce, at the 
same time, external reporting (Arnold D. and Ponemon L., 1991; Miceli M.P. and Near J.P., 1994; Taylor E.Z. 
and Curtis M.B., 2013; Seifert D. L. et al., 2014).  Although, monetary incentives cloud the intrinsic motiva-
tion of employees to report internally (Brink A.G. et al., 2013), a reward system, consisting of cash or a 




reporting and individuals with lower levels of moral reasoning are incentivized to blow the whistle as they 
perceive more benefits than costs for this action (Xu Y. and Ziegenfuss E., 2008; Dyck A. et al., 2010).  
Sometimes, e.g. when firms promote close working relationships through work teams, punishment may 
work better than reward in promoting whistleblowing (Boo E. et al., 2016). 
Appropriate channels for the disclosure of unethical behaviour enhance whistleblowing. In fact, 
some studies demonstrate that: 
1. anonymous reporting channels increase reporting intentions in small firms (Kaplan S.E., 1995) in 
particular when previous whistleblowers faced retaliation and previous transgressor did not face 
negative repercussions (Johansson E. and Carey P., 2016); 
2. external channels of disclosure incentivise whistleblowing in organisations where several levels within 
the hierarchy exist (King G., 1999). However, while Lowry P.B. et al. (2013) and Gao J. et al. (2015) 
have found that externally administered reporting channels increase whistleblowing intentions 
mitigating bystanders’ effect, Kaplan S.E. and Whitecotton S. M. (2001) have found that reporting 
intentions are stronger when the anonymous reporting channel is administered internally probably 
because participants believe that reporting to an externally administered channel, is similar to going 
outside the organisation. 
Several authors have also warned that sometimes whistleblowing policies could be not effectively 
implemented: this happens when organisations implement whistleblowing only for its signalling effect, that 
is, to legitimate their activities instead to obtain compliance with the law (Pitroff. E., 2014) or when policies 
are adopted by organisation modelling themselves after similar institutions which are perceived to be 
more successful, without considering organizational features and employees’ requirements (Pillay S. et al., 
2017).  
3. factors acting at the external environment level 
The effectiveness of whistleblowing is strictly linked to several factors acting at the national level. For ex-
ample, the capability to construct a policy which takes into consideration the specificity of the country sys-
tem and its culture, or the political will which determines the construction of effective measures to fight 
corruption. 
Contrarily to what we might expect, legislative protection is not the major determinant in the deci-
sion to blow the whistle (Brennan N. and Kelly J., 2007). Moreover, several studies have shown that legal 
procedures are less effective in encouraging positive organisational responses to whistle-blowing, than re-
sponses designed by the organisations themselves, since the latter not only focus the attention on whistle-
blowers protection but also on increasing other organisational members’ satisfaction (Near J.P. et al., 1993).  
This suggests that effective whistleblowing cannot be reached by the adoption of a standard policy which 
has been adopted in other countries (Hassink H. et al., 2007): several factors must be considered like the 
characteristics of the labour market and the welfare state (Marit S. and Trygstad S., 2010), the corporate 
governance systems in which whistleblowing regulations must be embedded (Pitroff E., 2016) and, first of 
all, national culture. Culture affects: the levels of ethical reasoning associated with more independent be-
haviour and then to whistleblowing (Tsui J., 1996); the perception of and judgement on whistleblowing 
(Brody R.G. et al. , 1998; Patel C. , 2003) so that it is less accepted as an internal control strategy in collec-
tivistic cultures (Cheng X. et al., 2015); the relationship between employee and company, since intentions 
to blow the whistle are highest in those cultures in which whistleblowers give more importance to the cor-
poration than on themselves (Gernon H., 1993).  
Furthermore, Schultz J.J. et al. (1993) have suggested that national culture dominates organisational cul-
ture in situations involving value judgments. 
Despite the interest of researchers on the issue of whistleblowing, the previous analyses suggest 
that there are two gaps in the literature, which this study attempts to address: 
a) first of all, findings of the majority of studies previously considered are referred to intentions to blow 




very difficult to carry out, since people and organisations are not willing to talk about their unethical 
conducts and there is a perception that the confidentiality of the report or the anonymity of the 
whistleblower could be broken.  
However, Mesmer-Magnus J. R. and Viswesvaran C. (2005) have proved that findings of research con-
ducted on whistleblowing intentions cannot be translated into conclusions about effective whistle-
blowing, suggesting the need to conduct further research on actual whistleblowing for a complete un-
derstanding of employees’ behaviour, 
b) factors affecting whistleblowing have been studied in private contexts while they remain almost 
unexplored for the public sector. 
 
4. Hypotheses, data, sample and methodology  
 
a. Hypotheses 
In the light of this gap, this paper investigates factors affecting internal whistleblowing in the Italian public 
sector starting from the analysis of reports sent to the Aos during the year 2016. Our study considers the 
effect of five factors, three of them involving organisations where civil servants work, and two, involving 
their environment. These factors refer to: 
1. the size of organisations, since the Italian public sector includes more than 7800 municipalities and 
most of them have a small dimension, 
2. the type of organisation, since this could have an impact on the way work is organized also 
considering that during the last decades the decentralization process has distributed power to lower 
levels of organisation incentivizing teamwork; 
3. the channel of communication which can be used to report wrongdoings internally, 
4. levels of corruption in working contexts,  
5. the level of corruption which characterises the external environment of the organisation. Indeed, in 
2016, Transparency International has placed Italy among the first European countries for the 
perceived level of corruption in the public and political sector; however, this overall value sums up 
very different regional situations which may have an impact on whistleblowing. 
The size of the organisation may influence employees’ willingness to report for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, in small organisations, there is a higher likelihood that other members may identify the 
whistleblower. The possibility for whistleblowers to be identified is a problem since they can be considered 
as “traitors” by peers and, in many cases, subject to their reprisal. In fact, Trevino L. and Victor B. (1992) in-
vestigating employees' inclination to report peers' conduct and the way in which they evaluate peer report-
ing, have found that peer reporters are negatively evaluated; only when there is a prescribed responsibility 
for the peer reporting role and the group shares the consequences of a violation, peer reporting is accept-
ed, and members of the group engage in whistleblowing.  
On the other hand, in small organisations also another factor can affect reports; indeed, the mutual control 
among employees can reduce corruption so that reports are not necessary. 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize the following: 
H1 – The smaller the size of the administrations the smaller the number of reports received. 
Structural features of the organisation may affect intentions to report wrongdoings. For example, 
several scholars have highlighted that teamwork may promote colleagues’ commitment creating unwritten 
norms which affect members behaviour: members of the group may force other members not “to tell” or, 
sometimes group commitment may increase the inclination of employees to become inactive observers 
(MacGregor J. and M. Stuebs. 2014; Miceli M. and Near J. P. 1985, 1988). These effects have been demon-
strated by Miller D. L. and Thomas S. (2005), who have found that employees are less likely to report team 
members’ wrongdoings than superiors’ or peer’s wrongdoings, and, in many cases, teamwork creates a dif-




members ignore the action, an employee member of the group feels increased pressure to go along with 
the wrong act. Obviously, this capability to affect the behaviour of the members of the group depends on 
several factors, such as, for example, members’ perception of dependency on the group, group cohesion or 
task difficulty which requires more collaboration among group members (Greenberger D. B. et al.,1987). 
Conversely, other studies have shown that a bureaucratic structure may increase the willingness to report 
when employees work referring to a supervisor and there is competition, or there are no forms of collabo-
ration or interdependence among peers, or groups are too large and so less cohesive. Near J. and Miceli M. 
(1995) have suggested that whistleblowing could be effective when formal mechanisms exist to encourage 
internal whistleblowing and when they operate consistent with the formalization, while King G. (1999) has 
found that whether there are several levels within the hierarchy or there are improper channels for the dis-
closure, whistleblowers use external channel.  
Considering that universities and healthcare companies, include two different hierarchies (professors and 
administrative staff and physicians and administrative staff, respectively) and the Aos belong to only one of 
these hierarchies, we suggest that employees not belonging to the administrative staff may not report 
wrongdoings internally since Aos are not perceived powerful enough to correct misconducts, as they have 
no power over professors or physicians. We, therefore, hypothesise that: 
H2: Universities and Local Healtcareh Authorities receive fewer reports. 
The channel which can be used to report wrongdoings may play an important role. In fact, face to 
face reporting implies more personal costs than anonymous reporting (Ayes and Kaplan, 2005). Although 
Lowe et al. (2014) and Ayes and Kaplan (2005) have found that there are no differences in reporting inten-
tions between anonymous and non-anonymous reporting channels, Lowry P.B. et al. (2013) have found that 
whistleblowing reporting systems which increase users’ perceptions of trust and anonymity may encourage 
employees to report wrongdoings. Considering that public administrations have adopted four channels to 
report wrongdoings (Ao’s statements distinguish among paper communication, email, dedicated IT systems, 
dedicated IT system which guarantees anonymity) or a combination of these four reporting channels, we 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H3- The greater is the secrecy assured by channels of communication created by the organisation, the great-
er is the number of complaints received. 
The organisational internal environment, in which employees work, as well as the external environ-
ment, with which public administrations interact, can have an impact on the disclosure of wrongdoings. On 
this point, De Vries M. and Sobis I. (2016) have suggested that corruption analyses must distinguish two 
scenarios: corruption in organisation where this kind of behaviour is widespread and corruption in organisa-
tions where it is rare.  
In the first case, corruption can be studied as a collective action problem, since it involves also honest peo-
ple who commit wrongdoings, since they are subject to organisational pressures and they need to avoid 
stress caused by acting differently from colleagues. This “conditional corruption” is also explained consider-
ing that “it would be stupid for individuals to be the only ones not to engage in wrongdoing if all other play-
ers judge it profitable to do that, even though the combination of all individual actions result in suboptimal 
outcomes and even though each player may have a personal inclination to act honestly” (De Vries M. and 
Sobis I, 2016; Sundström A. , 2016). When organizational culture normalizes wrongdoings, unethical behav-
iour prevails, expanding, in the long term the “logic of corruption” (Miceli M.P. et al., 2009). 
Conversely, when corruption is rare, it represents an individual act (which can be studied considering the 
agency theory) and it is the result of information asymmetry which provides opportunities for the agent to 
serve his/her self-interests at the expense of the principal. Moreover, in that situation, if most employees 
are committed to the organisation, blowing the whistle may not imply retaliation, since corruption and mal-
administration are generally condemned. Obviously, in this case, it is fundamental that managers (who must 
represent an example for employees) behave ethically and must punish the wrongdoer); as predicted by the 
Toxic Triangle and Pro-Social Organizational Behavioural models, the key components of problematic con-
duct are destructive leaders, susceptible followers and conducive or unstable environment (Reckers-Sauciuc 
A. and D. J. Lowe, 2010). We, therefore, hypothesise that: 




At the same time, whistleblowing may also be affected by the context where organisation operate. 
In fact, often the external environment can influence the way employees act inside the organisation. When 
corruption is widespread, it also involves rulers, monitoring and punishment and there are no actors who 
have the interest to hold corrupt officials accountable (Persson A. et al., 2013). Thus, a culture of corruption 
may reduce whistleblowing, since employees think that there is no possibility to obtain the respect of the 
rules by denouncing torts.  
Based on these arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
H5- The higher is the level of corruption in the external environment where public administrations work, the 
less is the number of reports received 
 
b) Data 
The data on internal whistleblowing were derived from the examination of information contained in Aos’ 
statements for the year 2016. In fact, Aos are required to prepare and submit to the Independent Assess-
ment Bodies, pursuant to article 1, paragraph 14, of law no. 190 of 2012, annual reports which contain an 
indication of the effectiveness of prevention measures laid down in the Three-year Plan to Prevent Corrup-
tion.  These reports are published on public administration’s websites in the section "Administration Trans-
parency", to guarantee the accountability of public sector administrations. Statements referred to the year 
2016, had to be published by 16 January 2017. These statements have been examined with respect to five 
categories of administrations: municipalities (distinguishing those which are province capital cities), regions, 
public universities, Local Health Authorities and provinces. 
In Aos’ statements, the following sections have been considered to study internal whistleblowing:   
1. point 6.A, which refers to the number of administration’s employees, to get information about the size 
of the administration, 
2. section 10, referred to the protection of civil servants who have reported wrongdoings, composed of 
point 10. A concerning the activation of whistleblowing policies, 10.B indicating reasons of no-
activation, 10.C related to channels available for employees to communicate wrongdoings, 10.D 
referred to the number of complaints received by the Ao in the year, 10.E which considers 
discrimination suffered by whistleblowers, and 10.G containing a general evaluation by Ao on 
whistleblowing.  
All this information has been collected in a spreadsheet indicating for each administration the region where 
it is located, the number of employees, the implementation (or not) of the policy, the means of communica-
tion made available to carry out the alerts, the number of reports received, internal reprisals following the 
presentation of the reports, the criticalities encountered in the implementation of whistleblowing.  
Then, this spreadsheet provides information on: 
• our dependent variable, since it provides the number of reports received from each public 
administration included in the sample. However, for our purposes, we have focused our attention not 
on the number of reports received by administrations, but on the fact the administrations have 
received reports, 
• our independent variables, as it includes data on: 
1. the number of employees in each administration, to measure the size of the organisation, 
2. type of administrations, distinguishing among municipalities, municipalities which are province capi-
tal cities, provinces, healthcare companies, universities and regional administrations,  
3. channels made available in each administration to report wrongdoings, since reports could be sent 
using paper, email, a computerised system, a computerised system which ensures the secrecy of 
communication, as well as the combination of them. 




To investigate whether the level of corruption (in the working context and in the external environment) may 
affect complaints, we have considered the following measures detailed at the regional level in the report 
“Corruption in Italy: the citizens’ point of view” published by Istat, on 12.10.2017: 
1) “Percentage of persons who have witnessed in their working environment an illicit trade”, which de-
scribes the level of corruption in organisation where employees work and which may affect organiza-
tional culture and employees behaviour; 
2) “Percentage of households in which at least one component has received in the last three years re-
quests for money, favours or gifts in exchange for favours or services”, which describes the general level 
of corruption in Italian regions. 
 
c)Sample 
759 public administrations have been considered to study the level of adoption of whistleblowing 
policies and reports received. This sample included 20 regions, 65 public universities, 97 provinces, 349 mu-
nicipalities, 111 municipalities which are province capital cities and 117 local health authorities as depicted 
in Table 1.  
The report for 34 administrations was not available on the institutional website. For the remaining 725 cas-
es, it was found that 82,48% of administrations (598 entities) have adopted the procedure for whistleblow-
ing protection.  
In 127 cases, whistleblowing had not been adopted, partly (65 entities) because it was not scheduled in the 
three-year anticorruption plan. However, a substantial number of administrations (56) did not adopt the 
procedure for whistleblowing despite the same being planned. The Aos’ reports justified this conduct main-
ly considering the following situations:  
1. the reorganisation processes that have involved provinces and which have determined other 
priorities, 
2. the deficiencies of staff that make it difficult to reconcile the activities envisaged in the anti-
corruption plan with ordinary institutional activity, 
3. the need to adopt measures to prevent corruption by respecting the principle of invariance of 
expenditure, which obliged to wait for the platform (not available yet) of the NAA, 
4. the small size of the institution which makes the measure ineffective as the facts of corruption can 
be easily discovered by the Ao, 
5. the fact that the code of conduct already describes protections for whistleblower and channels that 
could be used to report wrongdoings.  
Moreover, three administrations did not adopt the procedure but provided no justification for it, and, in 
three other cases, those responsible for preventing corruption did not provide any response to the specific 
question in the questionnaire related to the adoption of whistleblowing policy.  
The following table (Table 1) shows the number of reports received by type of administration considered, 
compared to the total number of the public bodies resulting in the country. 
Table1 - Public administrations considered in the study and reports received 
 Reports Administrations included in the sample 
Provinces  13 97 (110) 
Regions 10 20 (20) 
Local Health A. 38 117 (139) 
Municipalities  38 460 (7954) 
Universities 12 65 (67) 
TOTAL 111 759 (8290) 
 





In order to test hypothesis 1 (The smaller the size of the administrations the smaller the number of reports 
received), hypothesis 2 (Universities and Local Health Authorities, receive fewer reports) and hypothesis 3 
(The greater the secrecy assured by channels of communication created by the organisation, the greater the 
number of complaints received),  logistic regression analyses have been conducted to distinguish between 
administrations which have received reports and those which have not received reports (McCullagh P. and 
Nelder, J. A., 1989). In fact, our dependent variable is dichotomous, coded with 1 for administrations which 
have received reports and with 0 for administrations which have not received reports. 
The Logit model, applied to binary dependent variables, estimates the parameters of a logistic model, so 
that, the log-odds of the probability of an event (in our case the probability to receive complaints by civil 
servants) is a linear combination of the predictor variables, which are: 
1. the size or the organisation, measured considering the number of employees, 
2. the type of administration,  
3. the communication channel used to report wrongdoings. 
To test hypothesis 4 (The greater the level of corruption in the workplace, the lower the number of reports 
received) and hypothesis 5 (The higher the level of corruption in the external environment where public 
administrations work, the lower the number of reports received) we have used a Generalised Linear Mixed 
Model (GLMM). It represents an extension of the Generalised Linear Model, since the linear predictor in-
cludes, in addition to the usual fixed effect, a random effect. In fact, we measure corruption in the work-
place by the variable CORRLABEN, which reports, at the regional level, the “Percentage of persons who have 
witnessed in their working environment an illicit trade) while we measure corruption in the external envi-
ronment using the variable CORREXT, which refers to the “Percentage of households in which at least one 
component has received in the last three years requests for money, favours or gifts in exchange for favours 
or services” and which describes the general level of corruption in Italian regions. Since GLMM are regres-
sion models which include a random effect, quantifying the variation of regression intercept or slope among 
the levels of a grouping variable by a probability distribution, we have considered regions as the grouping 
units (second level units) since the variation among regions is more interesting than the effect of the single 
level. 
To investigate more indepth whistleblowing determinants and explain results obtained by quantitative 
analyses we have also:  
1) examined "General considerations" table, in Aos’ statements which return a description about the 
status of implementation of the anti-corruption plan, problems encountered in its enactment, the role 
played by the Ao in the public administration and problems encountered in the performance of his 
tasks, 
2) conducted four interviews asking to three Aos of public administrations (two municipalities which are 
province capital cities, and one university) and to the counsellor of the NAA, N. Parisi, some 
information on the functioning of whistleblowing.  





In order to test Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 Simple Logit Models were adopted to 
study the effects separately. univariate analysis was conducted. The decision to adopt a Logit Model ap-
proach, instead of a simple Chi-Squared Test, is motivated by the need to conduct a detailed study on the 






Table 2 - Univariate  analysis for testing Hypotheses 1 , 2 , 3 
H1 
Coefficients 





(intercept) -2,258E+03 <0.001*** 
Number of employees 5,045E-01 2.37e-14*** 
H2 
baseline (Province ) -1,6835 2.48e-08*** 
Regions 1,9067 0.000697*** 
Local Healthcare A. 1,0750 0.003196*** 




Universities 0.3398 0.443079 
H3 
(intercept) -2,4746 <0.001*** 
paper 0,3866 0.1082 
e-mail 0,544 0.0432** 
dedicated IT system 0,521 0.2016 





The results of the separate analyses show several significant effects (column 3 of Table 2, significance level 
p<=0.05): number of employees referred to Hypothesis 1, Regions, Local Healthcare Authorities and Munic-
ipalities referring to the type of administration considered in Hypothesis 2, e-mail and dedicated IT system 
which guarantees anonymity, referring to channels used to report wrongdoings considered in Hypothesis 3. 
The signs of the regression coefficients (column 2 of Table 2) correspond with the expected signs. A positive 
regression coefficient indicates that the higher the perceived relevance of that aspect, the higher the prob-
ability of receiving reports from employees, so that: 
1. according to hypothesis 1, a greater number of employees increase the likelihood for public 
administrations to receive reports since probably employees perceive that they cannot be easily 
identified by their peers, 
2. referring to hypothesis 2, the organisational structure of Regional administrations and Local Healthcare 
Authorities increase the likelihood of receiving reports, 
3. referring to hypothesis 3, public administrations which have adopted an email or a dedicated IT system 
which ensures anonymity to report wrongdoings have a higher likelihood to receive reports since these 
two means of communication are considered useful to guarantee secrecy. The perception of e-mail as a 
tool which ensures secrecy can be explained considering that many organisations have adopted 
channels to report based on paper or e-mail because they have no internal resources to develop a 
dedicated IT system and they could not increase their expenditure to implement anticorruption policy. 
Therefore, compared to paper, communication by email seems to mitigate the risk of being identified. 
For a negative coefficient, the opposite holds true, so that for Municipalities which are not province capital 
cities, and that usually have an organisational structure with fewer hierarchical levels there is a lower likeli-
hood to receive reports. 
Considering together all these independent variables in a model (Model 1), and grouping together 













(intercept) -2,780e+00 1,36e-09*** 
Number of employees 5,007E-04 5,67e-08*** 
Regions 0,6274 0,32858 
Local Health A. -0,5654 0,243 
Municipalities -4,11E-01 0,27426 
Universities -9,14E-02 0,86361 
paper 4,47E-01 0,11587 
e-mail 3,93E-01 0,2024 
dedicated IT system 5,93E-01 0,16931 
dedicated IT system + anonymity  0,7690 0,00909*** 
*p<=0.1, **p<=0.05,***p<=0.01 
 
The table shows that two characteristics are significant in the model: the number of employees and the 
adoption of a dedicated IT system as a channel to report wrongdoings. These two factors are linked to a 
higher likelihood of receiving reports from whistleblowers. Considering together the number of employees, 
the organisational type and the communication channels, we obtain that the organisational type is not sig-
nificant in determining reports, as probably it is strictly related to the number of employees. Then, Regions 
and Local Health Authorities receive more reports since they have more employees, while for municipalities 
which are not province capital cities the likelihood of receiving reports is lower since they have fewer em-
ployees. 
This also means, that in the set of our initial hypotheses, only two find support (H1 and H3), so that the type 
of organizational structure seems not to affect the intention to report. 
In order to test hypothesis H4 (The greater is the level of corruption in the workplace, the lower is 
the number of reports received), we have analysed the data, using GLMM, Model 2. The model includes the 
following variables: number of employees, type of administrations, channels of communication used to re-
port wrongdoings and level of corruption in the workplace measured at the regional level. 
 







(intercept) -3.608e+00 1,58e-05*** 
Number of employees 5,094e-04 4.42e-08*** 
Regions 1.007e+00 0.14345 
Local Healthcare A. -5.723e-01 0.24704 
Municipalities -2.206e-01 0.57024 
Universities -7.367e-02 0,89288 
paper 4.901e-01 0.09857* 
e-mail 4.109e-01 0.19519 
dedicated IT system 6.981e-01 0.12338 
dedicated IT system + anonymity  8.287e-01 0.00868*** 






Number of levels of random grouping function:20 
  Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq        Chi Df Pr(<Chisq) 
Null 
Model 2 518,43 527,05 -257,22 514,43 
Full Mod-
el 12 436,55 488,24 -206,27 412,55 101,89           10<2,2e-16*** 
 
The table shows that three characteristics are important: the number of employees, the availability of a 
dedicated IT system which guarantees anonymity and the possibility to signal wrongdoings using paper. 
However, H4 finds no support, since the level of corruption in the workplace is not relevant.  
To test hypothesis H5 (The higher the level of corruption in the external environment where public 
administrations work, the is the number of reports received) we have included the variable CORREXT with 
the purpose to verify whether the level of corruption which characterized organizations’ external envi-
ronment can have an impact on employee’s willingness to report. 
 







(intercept) -3.6303552 1,32e-08*** 
Number of employees 0.0005140 3.60e-08*** 
Regions 0.9960699 0.14828 
Local Healthcare A. -0.5969096 0.22904 
Municipalities -.02210226 0.56943 
Universities -0.0989085 0.85628 
paper 0.4987908 0.09284* 
email 0.4372883 0.16851 
dedicated IT system 0.6739056 0.13247 
dedicated IT system + anonymity  0.8165281 0.00969*** 
CORREXT 0.1777229 0.19010 
*p<=0.1, **p<=0.05,***p<=0.01 
Laplace approximation 
Number of levels of random grouping function:20 
  Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq        Chi Df Pr(<Chisq) 
Null 
Model 2 518,43 527,05 -257,22 514,43  
Full Mod-
el 2 435,32 487,04 -205,66 411,32 103,11           10<2 e-16*** 
 
 
The table shows that our hypothesis finds no support, so that the level of corruption characterising the ex-
ternal environment where public administrations operate has not an impact on civil servants’ willingness to 
report. 
Then, our quantitative analysis has highlighted that two factors affect the public administrations’ 
likelihood to receive allegations: their size and the type of channels available for reporting. In fact, munici-
palities which have received the highest number of alerts are generally large organisations, such as, for in-
stance, Rome (45 complaints out of 23.869 employees), Milan (14 complaints out of 15.208 employees), Li-
vorno (18 complaints out of 1.136 employees), Venice (13 complaints out of 2.930 employees), Palermo (9 




plaints, which are in 3 cases anonymous, out of 724 employees). The common factor of these municipalities 
is represented by the fact that they have adopted also specific channels for whistleblowing to guarantee a 
higher level of identity confidentiality since probably they have employees who have IT skills. For example, 
Rome, in the Ao’s report has clarified that “the platform adopted in 2015 can be used only by civil servants 
who have access to the employees’ portal. This system ensures the confidentiality of the report, since only 
the Ao can know whistleblowers’ identity and, at the same time, it makes it possible to add annexes to the 
complaint or to request further information to whistleblowers. All the actions are tracked on a special log. 
During 2016, reports increased with respect to the previous year, probably because the knowledge about 
the functioning of this tool is higher.” The Ao of Milan has also reported that the municipality has adopted 
an IT platform “which permits the confidentiality of the report and makes impossible to know identity. 
Whistleblowers’ reports received by the Ao have all the elements required, and all the reports have been 
examined by the Guarantee Institution which has always informed whistleblowers about initiatives under-
taken following the report. Some allegations have also led to the development of guidelines to improve 
administrative proceedings.” 
While large size organisations generally have more resources and then more employees and, 
hence, all the skills needed to create by themselves what required for the construction of effective chan-
nels to report, constraints imposed by the law for the implementation of whistleblowing seem to create 
more difficulties for small size organisation.  Rarely employees report wrongdoings in small organisation 
and, this could be explained considering that: 
1) in this type of organisation, is easier to understand who has blown the whistle, 
2) the organisation usually has not created channels ensuring identity confidentiality, and there is a huge 
chance of being discovered, 
3) in these organisations, groups are more cohesive, and peers exercise a control over other members of 
the group so that they can reduce corruption but sometimes also limit the willingness to report. 
 
6. Qualitative analyses 
 
a) Mechanisms which guide the functioning of whistleblowing  
The functioning of whistleblowing is linked to eight mechanisms described in Table 6, which are 
based on the following components. 
1. Confidentiality, since in disciplinary proceedings whistleblowers’ identity cannot be revealed without 
their consent or can be revealed only when its knowledge is essential for the defence of the blamed. 
2. No discrimination for those who report, as employees cannot be fired or penalised in their career for 
blowing the whistle. 
3. Definition, in the anti-corruption plan, of procedures to collect and handle complaints; 
4. Possibility of anonymous complaints. 
5. Possibility to report wrongdoings to external authorities (the NAA, the Court of Auditors and the 
Judicial Authority). 
6. No punishment for wrong complaints made in good faith. 
7. Definition of the Ao responsibilities since the Ao ensures, in line with guidelines contained in the 
National Anti-corruption Plan, the adoption of the plan for transparency and corruption prevention and 
its effective implementation. 
8. Culture and training aimed at increasing employees’ awareness about safeguards and law content, 







Our qualitative analysis has the purpose to verify the functioning of these mechanisms delivering 
insight useful to clarify the findings of our quantitative analysis.  To meet this target, we have interviewed a 
Counsellor of the NAA, and the Aos of two large size municipalities and one university located in the North 
East of Italy, an area generally perceived with a low level of corruption.  
The involvement of these parties is motivated by specific reasons. The NAA represents the fundamental 
node of the Italian anti-corruption policy and it is the recipient of external reports so that the interview 
could be useful to investigate the functioning of mechanism no. 5.  
The content of the Aos’ statement motivates the other interviews. In fact, this document for municipality A, 
which has more than 2.500 employees, specified for the year 2015 that there had been three complaints 
but also a discrimination act under investigation; as the following statement did not show complaints, we 
would like to verify whether that retaliatory act had affected employees’ intention to blow the whistle. For 
municipality B, which has less than 950 employees, 2016 Ao’s statement showed that there had been no 
complaints although some disciplinary and criminal proceedings for false stamps and false statements have 
been started during the year. Then, it would be interesting to investigate why employees have not blown the 
whistle to report those situations. For University C, instead, the document specified that complaints had not 
been received using whistleblowing channels even if they had been treated using whistleblowing proceed-
ings so that it would be interesting to verify whether the features of the organizational environment some-
times make whistleblowing channels to report wrongdoings not necessary. 
 
 





M1) CONFIDENTIALITY If the confidentiality of the reporting is guaranteed, whistleblowers are encour-
aged to report since there may be any reprisal against them by supervisors or by 
the group they belong 
 
M2) NO DISCRIMINATION If employees cannot be fired or penalised in their career, then employees will be 
encouraged to report because they cannot suffer retaliation 
 
M3) DEFINITION OF PROCEDURES TO COL-
LECT AND HANDLE COMPLAINTS 
If public administrations define modalities according to which complaints must be 
collected and handled, then there's any chance that complaints are ignored or the 
confidentiality of whistleblowers is violated 
 
M4) POSSIBILITY OF ANONYMOUS COM-
PLAINTS 
If employees can send anonymous complaints, then even those who think that the 
system is not adequate to ensure the confidentiality of the report will report 
M5)AVAILABILITY OF EXTERNAL CHANNELS If employees can report to parties outside the organisation, then all those who feel 
that they cannot have adequate safeguards by their organisation or that the recip-
ient has not enough power in the organisation, will report on the outside 
 
M6) NO PUNISHMENT FOR WRONG COM-
PLAINTS MADE IN GOOD FAITH 
If employees cannot be punished for wrong reporting, then they are incentivised to 
report  
 
M7) DEFINITION OF AO RESPONSIBILITIES If complaints are addressed to a third party, which is responsible for the adoption 
of appropriate measures using defined procedures, then there are chances that 
reports are taken into consideration and organisation change 
 
M8) CULTURE AND TRAINING TO INCREASE 
EMPLOYEES AND RPC AWARENESS  
If employees are aware of the importance of reporting, of protections that exist 
and their obligations, then a culture which encourages reporting can be created.  
If the Anti-corruption officer is aware of his/her responsibilities referred to the 
management of complaints, there will be proper procedures encouraging employ-





b) Dynamics in the field  
Our interviews have highlighted the existence of several issues in the functioning of whistleblowing: 
M1) Confidentiality 
The Aos of public administrations A and C have underlined their preference for direct communication with 
employees since it makes it possible to verify immediately allegations and whistleblowers’ good faith. Em-
ployees too, seem to prefer direct communication, as in administration C wrongdoings have not been re-
ported using the formal channel created for whistleblowing. Only the Ao of administration B has suggested 
that “sometimes, direct communications and unusual meetings with the Ao, could lead to the identification 
of whistleblowers” so that formal channels may encourage reports.  
Considering what is testified by the Ao of administration A, the real issues in ensuring confidentiality are re-
lated, on the one hand, to the structure of the organisation, since sometimes it makes possible to identify 
who has blown the whistle as only a few people have some information, and on the other hand, to the law. 
In fact, the introduction of art. 54-a has not really increased guarantees for employees denouncing wrong-
doings: identity confidentiality has been extended only for some cases of wrongdoings related to discipli-
nary proceedings, not for those involving criminal proceedings so that the capability of whistleblowing to 
give a contribution in fighting corruption can be very limited. This means that the law is not so satisfactory 
and the reaction of the organisation is fundamental. 
M2) No discrimination 
Referring to the retaliatory facts described in the Ao’s report for the year 2015, Municipality A has specified 
that the whistleblower had only highlighted the danger of possible reprisals against him, but the immediate 
transfer of the wrongdoer to another office has made it possible to prevent the threatened retaliation.  
However, referring to discriminations and retaliatory acts against whistleblowers, the Authority has ex-
plained that it has only the possibility to communicate to the Civil Service Inspectorate those discrimina-
tions which have been testified by employees since it has any direct sanctioning power. Penalties related to 
discriminations are applied by the Inspectorate whose evaluations do not consider the contribution em-
ployees have given to fight corruption and maladministration. 
M3) Definition of procedures to collect and handle complaints 
Interviews have clarified that the small number of reports received by the Aos has made unnecessary the 
construction of a specific structure or the definition of a procedure for their management, while three spe-
cific regulations define proceedings followed by the NAA. However, the Ao of administration C has also 
specified that universities are complex organisation composed by an administrative staff and a teaching 
staff, the latter governed by public law regulations and subject to the power of the university president and 
not to the power of the manager who covers the function of Ao. The presence of these two hierarchies and 
the fact that teachers are not subject to rules governing the civil service, require the mediation of the uni-
versity president for those wrongdoings which involve teachers since the Ao lacks the power to act directly. 
M4) Possibility of anonymous complaints 
The possibility to send anonymous complaints need to be balanced with the right of defence for the blamed 
to avoid cases of false reports whose purpose is to disparage someone. Then, anonymous reports are taken 
into consideration only when they are very detailed. 
M5) Availability of external channels 
In public bodies training for civil servants has clarified the existence of an external channel to report; how-
ever, the NAA has complained that civil servants have not understood the function of whistleblowing. It 
“has not the aim to ascertain a denied right to the employee” but “to protect a public, collective interest”, 
preventing similar cases from occurring in the future. Too many external reports could not be treated by the 
NAA since they refer to complaints involving civil servants’ competitions or their career proceedings, which 
fall under the specific competence of the Inspectorate of Public Function.  
M6) No punishment for wrong complaints made in good faith  
While administrations A, B and C have never received untrue complaints, the Councillor of the NAA has ex-




our context. “The aim of whistleblowing”, as specified by the NAA, “is to bring out facts of corruption and it 
is not important to know whether the whistleblower is in good faith; it is just necessary that there is an over-
riding public interest to report”. However, he has also underlined that the new draft on whistleblowing still 
contains this requirement. 
M7) Definition of Ao responsibilities 
Referring to the possibility that reporting could be encouraged by the fact that its management is entrusted 
to a third party, the Ao of municipality A has suggested that whistleblowing channels are useful for employ-
ees’ complaints related to their supervisors. However, it is not clear what happens when the Ao ignores a 
report.  
M8) Culture and training to increase employees and Ao awareness 
All the Aos have confirmed that they have not received a direct training from the NAA, but the Authority has 
published in its website some determinations for public sector bodies. Learning by doing is the method typ-
ically used to improve municipalities knowledge, while universities periodically organize meetings to discuss 
how to apply anti-corruption rules since these seem not to be designed for their structure. 
Conversely, the NAA has explained that training consists in: 
1. a meeting organized every year on 24 May with the involvement of 350/400 Aos to inform them of 
new anti-corruption rules, 
2. courses of the National Administrative School with which a special agreement has been signed. In 
this case, the NAA is part of the teaching class, 
3. opinions which can be requested by administrations to the NAA. 
 
c)What was not working  
Interviews have clarified that the limited success obtained in 2016 in the Italian public sector by 
whistleblowing, is justified by the fact that several mechanisms do not to work properly.   
Considering confidentiality, interviews have highlighted that the importance played by the availability of 
formal channels to report depends on organisational culture and Aos attitudes to communicate with em-
ployees: when organizational culture favours communication at any level of the organisation, as in munici-
pality A and university C, direct communication is considered preferable for both employees and Aos. Con-
versely, when relationships are more formal, for leadership imprinting as in municipality B, or in more bu-
reaucratic structures, or when wrongdoings involve supervisors the development of effective channels of 
communication is required.   
 Furthermore, in disciplinary and penal proceedings confidentiality ensured by article 54-a of legisla-
tive decree 165/2001 is very limited, and little has changed from the past, so that, in 2016, those who have 
reported probably were not aware that their identity could be revealed in numerous situations, also be-
cause employees have not been trained on the functioning of whistleblowing. Training has not received the 
attention required both at the central level and at the local level without considering that to change em-
ployees’ behaviour it is important to change the organisational culture and training plays a fundamental role 
to meet this end. Moreover, whether employees decide to send anonyms complaints, to safeguard their 
identity, usually reports are not taken into consideration except when they contain very detailed infor-
mation. At the same time, reports sent to the NAA are taken into consideration only when they refer to 
wrongdoings violating a public interest. 
Since the Civil Service Inspectorate evaluates situations without considering the contribution that employ-
ees have given to discover corruption or maladministration, discriminations sometimes cannot be avoided. 
Furthermore, as procedures to collect and handle complaints have not been defined in public administra-









Referring to the Italian public sector and to the year 2016, the current research has examined the 
impact on actual whistleblowing of the following factors: 
a) the size of the organisation, 
b) the type of organisation, 
c) channels available to report wrongdoings, 
d) levels of corruption characterising the internal and external organisational environment. 
First, our quantitative analysis has demonstrated that, the likelihood to receive allegations increase 
with public bodies’ size (measured considering the number of employees) and when channels created to 
report wrongdoings ensure more confidentiality. We think that these two results sometimes could be con-
nected, since large organisation usually have more resources and then more employees, and consequently 
also an IT support service which can provide internally what needed.  
Indeed, the data collected have also shown that not all public bodies in 2016 had adopted whistleblowing. 
Qualitative analysis has clarified that the failure in its enactment is mainly due to the lack of human and fi-
nancial resources needed and to the fact that the NAA’s IT platform to report wrongdoings guaranteeing the 
secrecy of employees’ identity was not till available. A regional administration (Basilicata) justified its non-
implementation explaining that a new bill in Parliament was going to be approved and before its approval 
civil servants could report wrongdoings using Ao’s e-mail. All these motivations denounce the difficulty that, 
local public bodies show in acting in a context where rules change every day without considering practical 
problems or specific features of the executive arm. 
Moreover, the expenditure constraints (anticorruption measures must be implemented without increasing 
public expenditure) and the delay in the delivery by the NAA of the platform for reporting wrongdoings, 
have led other administrations which indicated the adoption of whistleblowing, to a mere formal fulfilment 
of the law, since they have only stated that reports can be sent by e-mail or paper. Then, all these con-
straints have transformed an issue which requires a central attention to be solved in an administrative bur-
den. 
Qualitative analysis has also suggested that formal channels to report are not necessary for contexts where 
ethical leadership exists and the organizational culture favours communication at any level of the organisa-
tion. This confirms, on the one hand, Holmes S.A. et al. (2002) findings which demonstrate that employees 
engage in Organisational Citizen Behaviour when top management stresses the importance of employees’ 
ethical behaviour and, on the other hand, Hooks K.L. et al. (1994) findings suggesting that upstream com-
munication is a useful tool to control corruption, since “fraud involves concealment”. Moreover, in these 
contexts, the Aos seem to favour internal reporting by informal channels also to solve immediately situa-
tions which could harm the image of the administration damaging the political parties in charge. However, 
we think that these circumstances characterize only those contexts where corruption is rare. 
Secondly, our quantitative analysis has shown that the level of corruption which characterizes the 
internal or the external environment of public organisation does not affect the number of internal reports. 
However, we think that the impact of the level of corruption which permeates public bodies’ internal and 
external environment must be evaluated also in relation to external reports since previous studies have 
suggested that when corruption is widespread in the organisation, employees report to external authorities. 
Despite a recent introduction of freedom of information in the country, the NAA has not provided specifica-
tions related to external reports to deeply investigate this relationship. Nevertheless, the general report it 
publishes every year highlights that also external allegations have not had a great success. In 2016 the NAA 
has received only 252 reports from all public administrations in the country (and this number includes also 
allegations received for the same wrongdoing, while our data refer to administrations which have received 
allegations) which have led to 174 investigations. This means that probably employees do not trust this sys-
tem created to fight corruption. Furthermore, the fact that too many reports could not be treated by the 
NAA since they not refer to a public interest, seems to underline that whistleblowers’ reports represent 
overall a reaction engendered by anger from injustice they have suffered. The features of the Italian labour 




porting wrongdoings harming a public interest so that whistleblowing is too often a reaction against abuse 
motivated by personal reasons. 
The main limitations of this paper lie in the fact that it was not possible to analyse the relationship between 
external reports and the level of corruption in the working context and in the external environment and it 
was not possible to interview civil servants (since administrations have not given us the possibility to ask 
employees their opinion related the functioning of whistleblowing). Moreover, our analysis has focused the 
attention on 2016 only, and this does not allow us to capture possible long run effects linked to a copy-cat 
behaviour, stimulated by those situations in which whistleblowers have obtained the organisational changes 
hoped, or linked to the adoption of a different behaviour with respect to those who have denounced con-
sidering reprisals they have suffered. Although, that represents a limitation about the significance of the 
findings, information obtained has demonstrated that the problem of this anticorruption measure is not 
mimicry and the capability to adapt international policies to the local context or, culture and the level of in-
dividualism which lead people to care only the private interest instead of the collective resources. 
The number of internal reports collected by public administrations is very low if we consider that 
corruption in the country is widespread and, while quantitative analysis has shown that this is in part due to 
the small size of the Italian public sector bodies, interviews have clarified that the fundamental mechanisms 
of Italian whistleblowing seem not to work properly since article 54-a has neither enhanced protection for 
employees who denounce torts nor strengthen safeguards against organizations’ forms of retaliation. 
Hence, probably those who have denounced were not aware of these limitations also because training has 
not received the attention required both at the central and at the local level, without considering that it is 
essential to change organizational culture and signal employees that some values are important for the ad-
ministration. This confirms Wright B. E. et al. (2016) findings which suggest that subordinates express a 
higher willingness to report unethical behaviour since they are less concerned about the potential conse-
quences they may experience by reporting unethical conduct. 
Several scholars have suggested that “anti-corruption reforms will not succeed if there isn’t a strong 
political will” (Ledeneva A. et al., 2017) and probably this is the case, since laws are not satisfactory and not 
all resources needed have been put in place to deflate one of the biggest problems in this country. Further 
research could clarify whether L. 178/2017, which has amended the described rules, has increased its effec-
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introduce a reward system, 5) consider the structure of work groups 
and tasks, since quality circles or teams where workers are  interde-
pendent will inhibit whistle-blowing. 
Theoretical paper 
Gundlach M. I., 
Gundlach S. C., 
Douglas M. J. and 
Martinko M. J. 
The decision to blow the whistle: A 
social information processing 
framework.  
The Academy of Management 
2003 Whistleblowing decisions can be affected by individuals' analyses of 
perceived wrongdoing, as well as their perception of the consequences 
of acting. 
A subjective weighing up of consequences, which will vary among indi-
viduals, motivates Whistleblowing decisions.  
Perceptions of responsibility for and emotional reactions to perceived 
wrongdoing can generate a whistleblowing reaction which does not 
consider any perceived consequences. 
Theoretical paper (propo-
sitions) 
Hassink H., de 
Vries M. and Bol-
len L. 
A content analysis of whistleblowing 
policies of leading European com-
panies.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
2007 The adoption of a standard policy is not the best solution for a country. Examination of whistle-
blowing policies of 56 
leading European compa-
nies. 
Henik E. Understanding whistle-blowing: A 
set-theoretic approach  
Journal of Business Research 
2015 Two paths can lead to a whistleblowing outcome: 1) employees are 
motivated to blow the whistle by strong extra-organizational commit-
ments and anger at organizational inaction following internal reports; 
2) Employees are initially motivated to blow the whistle by strong ex-
tra-organizational principles even if this motivation is matched by an-
ger over retaliation following internal reports.  
Submitting 60 episodes 
drawn from 50 in-depth 
interviews with whistle-
blowers and inactive ob-





Associations between internal con-
trols and organizational citizenship 
behavior. 
 Journal of Managerial Issues 
2002 Employees will engage in Organisational Citizen Behaviour when top 
management stresses the importance of employees’ ethical behav-
iour. Fraud is rare in firms in which top management supports internal 
controls. Managers must support the internal control systems, which 
includes not only accounting or information systems but also ethical 
behaviour.  
Whistleblowing intentions 
by a questionnaire distrib-
uted to 8000 active mem-
bers of the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners 
Hooks K.L., 
Kaplan S. E. and 
Schultz J. J 
Enhancing communication to assist 
in fraud prevention and detection  
Auditing: A Journal Of Practice & 
1994 Upstream communication is important to control corruption, since 
fraud involves concealment. COSO prescribe upstream communication 





Theory not defined. 
Johansson E. and   
Carey P. 
Detecting Fraud: The Role of the 
Anonymous Reporting Channel  
Journal of Business ethics 
2016 Small firms benefit from implementing Anonymous Reporting Chan-
nels. Organisations with independent boards detect more fraud when 
they implement Anonymous Reporting Channels. 
Analyse of data from 231 
Australian public compa-
nies considering KPMG bi-
annual fraud surveys 
Jubb P.B. Auditors as whistleblowers. Interna-
tional Journal of Auditing 
2000 Auditors cannot be considered as whistleblowers: disclosures for audi-
tors are a duty since they are role prescribed; auditors' acts are not an 
expression of dissent; auditors' acts do not violate organisation loyalty; 
auditors' disclosures are not addressed to an external entity. 
Theoretical paper 
Jubb P. B. Whistleblowing: A restrictive defini-
tion and interpretation.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
1999 Whistleblowing acts are voluntary since they are not performed under 
threat or duress and they are not obligatory. The disclosure represents 
an act of dissent from the peer group and does not violate organiza-
tional loyalty. 
Theoretical paper 
Kaplan S. E. and 
Whitecotton S. 
M. 
An examination of auditors’ report-
ing intentions when another audi-
tor is offered client employment.  
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 
2001 Intentions to report a fraudulent act using an anonymous reporting 
hotline is not greater under strong procedural safeguards than under 
weak procedural safeguards. Information about procedural safeguards 
is not sufficient to increase whistleblowing intentions. The effect of 
anonymous reporting channel’s procedural safeguards does not de-
pend upon the type of fraudulent act even if the intention to report a 
fraudulent act concerning misappropriation of assets is higher than 
that related to the reporting of an act involving fraudulent financial 
reporting; reporting intentions are stronger when the anonymous re-
porting channel is administered internally probably because partici-
pants believe that reporting to an externally administered channel, is 
similar to going outside the organisation. 
 
Whistleblowing intentions 
considering 65 on-line 
MBA students attending a 
meeting campus 
Kaplan S.E. An examination of auditors' report-
ing intentions upon discovery of 
procedures prematurely signed-off - 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 
1995 Compared to non-anonymous reporting channels, anonymous report-
ing channels increased reporting intentions, when: 
1) Previous whistleblowers faced retaliation, 
2) Previous transgressors did not face negative repercussions.  
Whistleblowing intentions 
according to an experi-





Kaptein M. From inaction to external whistle-
blowing: the influence of the ethical 
culture of organisation on employee 
responses to observed wrongdoing.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
2011 The ethical culture of an organisation is important in encouraging whis-
tleblowing. Clarity, supportability, discussability, and sanctionability are 
particularly relevant in encouraging employees to take positive action.  
Whistleblowing intentions 
according to 5065 ques-
tionnaires collected from 
the US working population 
Keenan J. P. Whistleblowing: A study of mana-
gerial differences.  
Employee Responsibilities and 
Rights Journal 
2002 All managerial levels are willing to blow the whistle: upper-level man-
agers followed by middle-level and first-level managers, are less de-
pendent on the organisation and are thus more likely to blow the 
whistle for wrongdoings. The different degrees of fear of retaliation 




submitting a questionnaire 
via mail to 131 upper -
level managers, 188 mid-
dle-level managers and 
3500 first-level managers 
Keil M., Tiwana 
A., Sainsbury R. 
and Sneha S. 
Toward a theory of whistleblowing 
intentions: A benefit-to-cost differ-
ential perspective.  
Decision Sciences 
2010 Personal reporting responsibility, trust in supervisors, reporting ano-
nymity, management responsiveness and an organizational climate 
conducive to reporting enhances whistleblowing intentions because it 
increases benefits relative to perceived costs. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
considering data collected 
from 159 experienced IT 
project managers. 
King G. The implications of an organization’s 
structure on whistleblowing.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
1999 Appropriate channels for the disclosure of unethical behaviour en-
hance whistleblowing. 
In organisations where there are several levels within the hierarchy 
whistleblowers use external channels of disclosure. 
Theoretical paper 
Larmer R. Whistleblowing and employee loy-
alty.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
1992 The relationship between whistleblowing and loyalty: whistleblowers 




letta, D.F. and 
Vance A. 
The drivers in the use of online 
whistle-blowing reporting systems.  
Journal of Management Infor-
mation Systems 
2013 Reporting channels administered externally may be more effective 
than those administered internally since whistleblowing intentions are 
higher when the reporting channel is administered externally than 
when it is administered internally. The presence of bystanders does 
not affect the intentions to blow the whistle when the reporting 




scenarios to 202 online 
working professionals  
MacGregor J. and 
Stuebs M. 
The Silent Samaritan Syndrome: 
Why the Whistle Remains Unblown’ 
Journal of Business Ethics 
2014 Awareness, community and moral competence dimensions affect the 
desire to remain silent. Whistleblowing programs should support and 
develop employee awareness of inappropriate activities and whistle-
blowing responsibilities; academic education, business training and de-
velopment programs should work together to develop educated pro-
Whistleblowing intentions 






Marit S. and 
Trygstad S.  
When whistle-blowing works: the 
Norwegian case 
Human relations 
2010 The effectiveness of Norwegian whistleblowing policies is explained 
considering characteristics of the labour market, welfare state and 
structures which favour a communication culture in the organisation. 
Actual whistleblowing 




J. R. and 
Viswesvaran C. 
Whistleblowing in organisation: An 
examination of the correlates of 
whistleblower intention, action, and 
retaliation.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
2005 Findings of research conducted on whistleblowing intentions cannot 
be translated into conclusions about effective whistleblowing. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
and whistleblowing action 
comparison considering 
previous research 
Miceli M. P. and 
Near J.  P. 
Individual and situational correlates 
of whistle-blowing  
Personnel Psychology 
1988 Whistle-blowing is more likely when observers of wrongdoing: 1) tend 
to have higher levels of professional status, 2) are members of larger 
work groups, 3) are satisfied with aspects of their working life, 4) be-
lieve that problems can and will be corrected 
Analysis of archival survey 
data related to individuals 
who observed wrongdoing 
in 22 organisation (US 
Merit Systems Protection 
Board survey) and decided 
to report wrongdoing (ac-
tual whistleblowing) 
Miceli M. P. and 
Near J.  P.  
Whistleblowing: Reaping the Bene-
fits  
The Academy of Management Exec-
utive 
1994 Wrongdoing prevention is more effective than whistleblowers protec-
tion from retaliation. Organizational policies should specify what activ-
ities are considered wrongdoings and state adequate responses to 
wrongdoing that are signalled. Managers’ values are more useful than 
the communication of policies since they can be emulated by employ-
ees. Company response to the complaint is very important since it 
avoids external reporting and incentivized whistleblowing. 
Theoretical paper 
Miceli M. P. and 
Near J. P. 
Characteristics of organizational 
climate and perceived wrongdoing 
associated with whistle-blowing de-
cisions  
Personnel Psychology 
1985 Employees are more likely to blow the whistle when they have con-
vincing evidence of wrongdoing, if the wrongdoing is serious and when 
it directly affects them. Inactive observers may be employees especial-
ly sensitive to potential retaliation or members of small organisations. 
Examination of 8600 ques-
tionnaires concerning 
whistleblowing filled in by 
employees of 15 organisa-
tions (US Merit Systems 
Protection Board survey 
and archival information 
gathered by the Offices of 
the Inspector General) 




Near J. P. ganizational position, and whistle-
blowing status: A discriminant anal-
ysis.  
Academy of management Journal 
observe  wrongdoings; 2) individuals who observe but do not report 
wrongdoings (usually supervisors, having low pay but good education 
or young, potential, low seniority employees); 3) individuals who ob-
serve and report wrongdoings by all channels (employees in nonsuper-
visory positions and who receive high pay in spite of their low educa-
tion); 4) individuals who observe and report wrongdoings by internal 
channels (powerful organisation members, highly educated, with su-
pervisory positions and/or positions for which internal whistle-blowing 
was role-prescribed). 
considering a sample of 
8500 public employees  
Miceli M.P., Near 
J.P. and Dworkin 
T.M. 
A Word to the Wise: How Managers 
and Policy-Makers Can Encourage 
Employees to Report Wrongdoing 
Journal of Business Ethics 
2009 Cultures that normalize wrongdoing increase a ‘‘logic of corruption’’ 
that may be disrupted; whistleblowers are an important element to 
change this type of organisational culture.   
Theoretical study based on 
previous research on whis-
tleblowing  
Miller D. L. and 
Thomas S.  
The impact of relative position and 
relational closeness on reporting of 
unethical acts 
Journal of Business Ethics 
2005 Supervisors and team members affect whistleblowing. Employees are 
less likely to report peers’ wrongdoings than supervisors’ wrongdo-
ings, even if a close relationship between the employee and his su-
pervisor mitigate the likelihood of reporting wrongdoings. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
submitting vignettes to 
151 undergraduate man-
agement students  
Misangyi V. F., 
Weaver G. R. and 
Elms H. 
Ending corruption: The interplay 
among institutional logics, re-
sources, and institutional entrepre-
neurs. – 
Academy of Management Review 
2008 Corruption “reflects an institutional logic that identifies corrupt 
behaviour as legitimate”. To change this logic a long-term process is 
required to: 1) address identities and practices, 2) engage institutional 
entrepreneurs who possess capabilities to communicate the new 
institutional logic; 3) employ resources to sustain the new logic.  
 
Theoretical paper which 
considers theories of 
institutions and collective 
identities presents a 
framework of institutional 
change 
Near J. and M. 
Miceli 
Effective Whistle-Blowing  
Academy of Management Review 
1995 The effectiveness of whistleblowing will be enhanced when: 1) 
coworkers, managers, and the complaint recipients perceive that the 
whistleblower is credible and he is relatively powerful in the organisa-
tion; 2) the complaint recipients are credible or powerful, and also 
supportive of the whistleblower; 3) whistleblowers identify them-
selves; 4) The wrongdoer has little power and/or credibility; 5) the  or-
ganisation is not dependent on the wrongdoing and the wrongdoing is 
evident; 6) the activity reported is clearly illegal; 7) the organisation or 
informal norms prescribe whistleblowing as appropriate behaviour; 9) 
organizational climate discourages wrongdoing, encourages whistle-
blowing, and discourages retaliation against whistle-blowers;10) the 





encourage internal whistleblowing. 
Near J. and Miceli 
M. 
Organizational dissidence: The case 
of whistle-blowing.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
1985 Whistleblowing is more likely to occur when: 1) observers of wrongdo-
ing can verify that questionable activity has occurred, this activity is 
clearly wrong, the wrongdoing is important; 2) whistleblowing results 
in an organizational change, organisational climate is conducive of dis-
sidence; 3) observers of wrongdoing are male, have high self-esteem, 
an internal locus of control and a high level of moral reasoning; 4) ob-
servers of wrongdoing are more loyal to the organisation than to pro-
fessional groups and have  support from family or friends; 5) employ-
ment rates are high in their labour markets; 6) observers of wrongdo-
ing think that alternative actions are not possible; 7) The organisation 
is dependent on the whistleblower and is less dependent upon the 
wrongdoer. 
Theoretical paper based 
on empirical literature 
Near J. P. and 
Miceli M.P. 
Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality  
Journal of management 
1996 Most whistleblowers do not suffer retaliation, and do not consider re-
taliation a determining factor of their decision. 
Theoretical paper Review 
of findings of previous 
empirical research 
Near J., Dworkin 
T. and Miceli M. 
Explaining the whistle-blowing pro-
cess: Suggestions from power theo-
ry and justice theory 
OrganisationScience 
1993 Legal procedures are less effective in encouraging positive organiza-
tional responses to whistle-blowing, than legalistic responses designed 
by the organisation themselves, since they focus their attention only 
on the protection of whistleblowers while it is also important to in-
crease the satisfaction of other organisation members. 
Review of three sets of 
studies on federal employ-
ees and whistleblowing 
policies, on the effects of 
state laws and on role pre-
scribed whistleblowing 
Patel C. Some cross-cultural evidence on 
whistle-blowing as an internal con-
trol mechanism.  
Journal of International Accounting 
Research 
2003 Cultural values affect whistleblowing. Australian culture supports whis-
tleblowing   more than Indian and Chinese-Malaysian cultures. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
and perception by a ques-
tionnaire administered to 
a sample of senior profes-
sional accountant firms in 
Australia, Malaysia and In-
dia  
Persson A., Roth-
stein B. and Te-
orell J. 
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail – 
Systemic Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem.   
Governance 
2013 Contemporary anti-corruption reforms in countries with rampant cor-
ruption fail, since corrupt behaviour is the norm and there are no ac-
tors who have the interest to monitor and punish corrupt officials. 
Interview study in Kenya 
and Uganda to examine 
the effectiveness of anti-
corruption reforms in con-




Pillay S., Reddy 
P.S. and Morgan 
D. 
Institutional isomorphism and 
whistle-blowing intentions in public 
sector institutions-  
Public management review 
2017 Institutions model themselves after similar institutions which are per-
ceived to be more successful to obtain external legitimacy through 
sophisticated whistleblowing policies and systems while employees 
are often constrained by bureaucratic hierarchies and cultural orienta-
tions.  
Whistleblowing intentions 
considering results of a 
questionnaire filled in by 
200 employees in the 
South Africa 
Pittroff E. Whistle-blowing systems and legit-
imacy theory: A study of the moti-
vation to implement whistle-
blowing systems in German organi-
sation. 
Journal of Business Ethics 
2014 An organisation implements whistleblowing for its signalling effect, 
that is, to legitimise its activities instead of obtaining compliance with 
the law.   
Actual whistleblowing by 
surveys conducted among 
84 German organisations 
Pittroff E. Whistle-blowing regulation in dif-
ferent corporate governance sys-
tems: an analysis of the regulation 
approaches from the view of path 
dependence theory.  
Journal of Management & Govern-
ance 
2016 Countries must adopt whistleblowing regulations which take into con-
sideration the characteristics of the corporate governance systems in 
which they must be embedded. 
Examination of a country's 
legal approach to whistle-
blowing regulations. 
Ponemon L. A Whistle-Blowing as an Internal Con-
trol Mechanism: Individual and Or-
ganizational Considerations  
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 
1994 Whistleblowing is an important control mechanism but requires: 1) 
effective channels for communicating wrongdoing; 2) a reward struc-
ture or a protecting structure; 3) adequate communication channels. 




A. and Lowe D. J. 
The influence of dispositional affect 
on whistle-blowing.  
Advances in Accounting 
2010 Wrongdoings are usually the consequence of destructive leaders, sus-
ceptible followers and conducive or unstable environments. The envi-
ronment can promote or discourage whistleblowing, since it may pro-
mote states such as fear and anger and fear leads to compliance while 
anger leads to resistance. Organisations need to encourage active dis-
positions by increasing personal responsibility in subordinates, training 
and rewarding active behaviour. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
considering MBA students 
Rothwell G. R. 
and Baldwin J. N. 
Ethical climate theory, whistle-
blowing, and the code of silence in 
police agencies in the state of Geor-
gia.  
Journal of Business Ethics 
2007 Police officers' propensity to report peer misconduct in Georgia 
demonstrates that:  1) a friendship or team climate generally explains 
willingness to blow the whistle, but not the actual frequency of blow-
ing the whistle, 2) supervisory status, is the most consistent predictor 
of both willingness to blow the whistle and frequency of blowing the 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by a study that considers 
propensity of police offic-
ers of the state of Georgia 




whistle, 3) organisation size and tenure are not positively related to 
whistle-blowing and this can be explained considering that large organ-
isation are more likely to have formal mechanisms that facilitate whis-
tleblowing, but they also have hierarchies and obstructed communica-
tions channels, and that tenure has an impact on socialization and peer 
pressure to conform to a code-of- silence. 
Schultz J. J., 
Johnson D. A., 
Morris D. and 
Dyrnes S. 
An Investigation Of The Reporting 
Of Questionable Acts In An Interna-
tional Setting 
 Journal of accounting research 
1993 The likelihood of reporting questionable acts is related to national cul-
ture, suggesting that multinationals should emphasize different ele-
ments in their training programs. Reporting tendencies are a function 
of national and specific circumstances. National culture dominates or-
ganizational culture in situations involving value judgments, suggest-
ing that multinational companies need to implement different control 
systems across divisions located in different countries.  
 
Theoretical paper 
Seifert D. L., 
Stammerjohan 
W. W. and Martin 
R. B. 
Trust, Organizational Justice, and 
Whistleblowing: A Research Note  
Behavioural research in accounting 
2014 In improving the probability of the internal reporting of wrongdoing, 
trust in the supervisor and in the organisation, play an important role. 
Organisational justice is an important means to promote additional 
trust in both the organisation and the supervisors. 
 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by an experimental study 
among internal auditors 
and management ac-
countants 
Seifert D. L., 
Sweeney J. T., 
Joireman J. and 
Thornton J. M. 
The influence of organizational jus-
tice on accountant whistleblowing.  
Accounting, Organisation and Socie-
ty 
2010 Whistleblowing policies characterised by higher levels of procedural, 
distributive and interactional justice raise the likelihood of organisa-
tional accountant reporting financial statement fraud. Management 
can improve the internal disclosure of financial statement fraud by in-
corporating principles of organizational justice in the design of whis-
tleblowing policies. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by an experiment involv-
ing 447 internal auditors 
and management ac-
countants 
Sundström  A. Violence and the costs of honesty: 
rethinking bureaucrats' choices to 
take bribes  
Public Administration 
2016 The influence of group norms is more important than that of formal 
hierarchy in affecting whistleblowing. Team conditions reduce whis-
tleblowing since employees are less likely to report team members' 
wrongdoings than superior's or peer’s wrongdoing; the group creates 
a diffusion of responsibility, reducing responsibility for reporting per-
ception for each member. A close relationship with a superior repro-
duces a situation similar to that of group membership, leading to the 
same reporting behaviour. 
Interviews with 34 inspec-





Taylor E. and Cur-
tis M. 
An examination of the layers of 
workplace influences in ethical 
judgments: Whistleblowing likeli-
hood and perseverance in public ac-
counting. 
Journal of Business Ethics 
2011 Professional identity influence auditors’ initial reporting intentions, 
while employee’s commitment to the firm determines the persever-
ance in reporting wrongdoings. Firms should align organizational 




countants’ reaction to 
three vignettes describing 
unethical behaviour 
Taylor E. Z. and 
Curtis M. B. 
Whistleblowing in audit firms: or-
ganizational response and power 
distance 
Behavioural research in accounting  
2013 Whether organisational response to reports of wrongdoing is strong, 
witnesses report to supervisors more than peers; whether organiza-
tional response to reports of wrongdoing is weak, witnesses report to 
press more than supervisors 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by a survey involving 108 
audit seniors from a Big 4 
firm in the US 
Trevino L. and 
Victor B. 
Peer Reporting of Unethical Behav-
ior: A Social Context Perspective. 
The Academy of Management Jour-
nal 
1992 Work group members have little inclination to report peers’ miscon-
duct; group sharing of the consequences of a violation and prescribed 
responsibility for the peer reporting role, can influence the acceptabil-
ity of peer reporting. 
When peer reporting is not the responsibility of group members or the 
consequences of the violation are not shared, a peer reporter may be 
considered highly ethical, but peers reject the person involved.  
Whistleblowing intentions 
by submitting two scenari-
os to 478 undergraduate 
students in a college of 
business. 
Tsui J. “Auditors” Ethical Reasoning: Some 
Audit Conflict and Cross-Cultural 
Evidence 
International Journal of Accounting 
1996 Cultural differences could affect levels of ethical reasoning; higher lev-
els of ethical reasoning are associated with more independent behav-
iour. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
and perceptions by com-
paring ethical reasoning of 
auditors in the USA and 
Hong Kong 
Vadera A. K., 
Aguilera R. V. and 
Caza B. B 
Making sense of whistle-blowing’s 
antecedents: Learning from re-
search on identity and ethics pro-
grams. Business Ethics Quarterly 
2009 Individuals have multiple simultaneous identities and identifications 
derived from being members of groups (social identities), covering 
roles (role identities) or possessing certain features (personal identi-
ties) which are organized in a "salience hierarchy". The decision to 
blow the whistle depends primarily on one's moral identity and work 
identity, even if also other identities may play a role. 
Literature review of arti-
cles referred to whistle-
blowing 
Vandenabeele W. 
and Kjeldsen A. 
M 
The relationship between public 
service motivation and whistle-
blowing intention: interplay of indi-
vidual and structural elements 
Paper presented at the annual EGPA 
conference, SGIII, Bucharest, Roma-
nia 
2011 Public Service Motivation is positively related to whistleblowing inten-
tions; however, a protection system moderates this effect, suggesting 
that both self-interested and pro-social motivations are important to 
take the decision. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
based on a survey among 




Wright B. E., Has-
san S. and Park J. 
Does a public service ethic encour-
age ethical behaviour? public ser-
vice motivation, ethical leadership 
and the willingness to report ethical 
problems  
Public Administration 
2016 Supervisors exhibiting higher ethical leadership are more likely to have 
subordinates with higher levels of Public Service Motivation (PSM) 
since they behave in line with the social norms of the work unit and 
since supervisors select and retain employees that behave ethically. 
Subordinates with higher PSM express a higher willingness to report 
any unethical behaviour of others within their agency. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
considering data collected 
through a survey from 477 
employees working in a 
large state agency 
Xu Y. and Zieg-
enfuss E. 
Reward systems, moral reasoning, 
and internal auditors’ reporting 
wrongdoing - Journal of Business 
Psychology 
2008 A reward system, consisting in a cash reward or in a continuing em-
ployment contract, is useful since it sends a signal to employees that 
top management encourages reporting. Individuals with lower levels 
of moral reasoning are incentivized to blow the whistle since they per-
ceive more benefits than costs for this action. 
 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by a survey mailed to 201 
internal auditors  
Y.J. Cho and H.J. 
Song 
Determinants of whistleblowing 
within government agencies  
Public Personnel Management 
2015 Personal costs decrease whistleblowing intention while organizational 
support and organizational protection, which constitute situational fac-
tors, contribute enhancing whistleblowing intention; Public Service 
Motivation and education on whistleblowing, which constitute individ-
ual factors, increase the intention to blow the whistle. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
among US federal employ-
ees  
Zhang J., Pany K. 
and Reckers P. M. 
Under which conditions are whis-
tleblowing best practices best? Au-
diting: A Journal of Practice & Theo-
ry 
2013 External whistleblowing is conditioned by previous poor organisation 
responses to whistleblowing and a limited proactive behaviour of em-
ployees to report. 
Whistleblowing intentions 
by a behavioural experi-
ment involving 130 even-




Twenty years of Freedom of Information Laws 





The paper systematically reviews research on Freedom of Information laws published between 1998-2018. 
The review, analysing 75 studies published in leading journals, addresses the following questions: 1) How is 
the literature developing for freedom of information laws? 2)What is the focus of the literature? 3)What are 
the implications for research on freedom of information?   
In addressing these questions, the paper underlines the preconditions required for the introduction of Foil 
laws, the conditions enabling citizens to exercise the right of access to public information, the factors affect-
ing the performance of laws and some outcomes achieved. 
The findings of this analysis make it possible to outline an agenda for future research on citizens’ right to 
know, which calls for: an examination of cultural and political factors affecting contexts where these laws 
have been approved; studies monitoring the evolution of these laws over time and, based on an evaluation 
of actions of all parties involved (citizens, politicians, bureaucrats, international organisations, lobbies) for 




Freedom of Information (FOI), Right to Information (RTI) or Access to Information (ATI) laws have 
the purpose of giving citizens or interested parties access to documents held by their governments without 
the need to prove a legal interest to obtain them (Berliner D., 2014). 
Their introduction represents a global trend favoured by the international attention on transparen-
cy, but also by the technology boom and the democratisation movement following the cold war period. 
In 2016 RTI laws were in place in 100 countries (World Bank, 2016). 
However, these regulations have been adopted during a long period. While Sweden introduced the first in-
formation disclosure system in 1766, 34 countries adopted these laws only between 2000 and 2005. Contra-
ry to what one would expect, among these late-adopters there are countries such as United Kingdom 
(2000), Switzerland (2004) and Germany (2005), while some developing and transition countries have intro-
duced regulations on disclosure in the 1990s (for example Colombia introduced this regulation in 1985, 
Hungary and Ukraine in 1992).    
This suggests that probably several factors influence their introduction. 
Recently, for example, international organisations have promoted the adoption of citizens’ right to know to 
ensure transparency with the aim of reducing corruption. 
However, the main factor which affects the introduction of freedom of information laws seems to refer to 
political circumstances and the need to balance two different situations: the introduction of Foi laws is use-
ful to attract political support, although the doings of politicians and bureaucrats exposed to public scrutiny 




This problem has led in too many cases to the approval of laws which are "good-looking from a dis-
tance" but are not useful in practice (Michener G., 2011). For this reason, it is not only relevant to consider 
whether a country has approved a law on citizens' right to know, but it is fundamental to evaluate how 
these laws perform. 
As Michener G., (2011) has suggested, “Foi laws are meant to make the government more profes-
sional, predictable, and accountable, and citizens more proactive in public life." […] “In theory, eliminating 
information asymmetry should help to promote greater economic transparency and stability, encourage 
more carefully crafted public policy, make it easier for different wings of government to talk to one another, 
and empower citizens and the press to monitor the conduct of public affairs more fully."   
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these laws reach their goals and citizens can affect public administra-
tions decisions. Furthermore, it is not clear what are the factors ensuring the effectiveness of these laws 
and what are the issues limiting their performance. 
To clarify these aspects, we present a cross-disciplinary Structured Literature Review (SLR) of papers 
published from 1998 to July 2018 and dealing with freedom of information laws. By highlighting themes 
which form the evolving body of the literature, the paper helps to clarify conditions required for the intro-
duction of these laws and their effective enactment and outcomes achieved. Moreover, underlining gaps in 
our understanding, the review of the literature tries to provide insights and to contribute to set an agenda 
for future research.   
We structure the remainder of this paper as follows. Section 2 describes, in the first part, the SLR 
method for selecting and analysing the articles and, in the second part, provides insights and critiques. Sec-
tion 3 presents the conclusions and illustrates some limitations of this study. 
 
2. Structure of the literature review 
Employing an SLR approach, as described in Massaro et al. (2016), this paper analyses previous 
scholarly work with the purpose of understanding the development of knowledge in the field of freedom of 
information laws adopted around the world. 
As explained by Massaro et al. (2016), "an SLR is a method for studying a corpus of scholarly litera-
ture, to develop insights, critical reflections, future research path, and research questions". An SLR has a log-
ical structure which is the result of several steps followed in its construction. Massaro et al. (2016) have 
highlighted ten successive steps for developing it: 
1. “Write a literature review protocol, 
2. Define the questions that the literature review is setting out to answer, 
3. Determine the type of studies and carry out a comprehensive literature search, 
4. Measure article impact, 
5. Define an analytical framework, 
6. Establish literature review reliability, 
7. Test literature review validity, 
8. Code data using the developed framework, 
9. Develop insight and critique through analysing the dataset, 
10. Develop future research path and questions”. 
The following sections describe the steps followed for the construction of the SLR on freedom of infor-
mation laws, except for phase n. 6, since papers are examined by one person ensuring homogeneity in 











2.1 Research method 
a) The literature review protocol 
The review protocol "has the aim of documenting the procedure followed, which is widely connect-
ed with the aim of increasing research reliability" (Massaro et al., 2016). This study, on the basis of citations' 
analysis, has selected the most important journals which have published articles related to Foi laws to iden-
tify variables previously not analysed in the literature. Coding nodes examine some features of these publi-




b) Define the questions that the literature review is setting out to answer 
Considering what Alvesson and Deetz have suggested, referring to the three tasks of critical re-
search ("insight," "critique" and "transformative redefinitions"), Massaro et al. (2016) have advised that “at 
least, three main research questions need answering in an SLR." "The first SRL question needs to provide 
answers to what is the history of the field under review and how does the prior literature contribute to 
where the field is today." "The second question is based on a critical analysis of the existing literature's fo-
cus and builds upon, and interact with, insights." The third question has the purpose to "make normative 
arguments about what future research paths and questions work towards potential implications for prac-
tice, education, policy and/or regulation." 
Complying with this advice, the following research questions have been identified in this study: 
RQ1: How is the literature developing for freedom of information laws? 
RQ2: What is the focus of the literature? And specifically:   
1. What are the factors affecting the introduction of Foi laws? 
2. What are the factors which guarantee citizens’ right to know? 
3. What are the main issues affecting the performance of these laws? 
4. Which are the outcomes of these laws? 
RQ3: What is the future/are the implications for research on freedom of information? 
c) Determine the type of studies and carry out a comprehensive literature search 
The selection of relevant material has been based on the following strategies. 
First, we searched articles written in English and related to the subject areas "Social science" and 
"Business, management and accountability" in the Scopus database using the following keywords: "FOIA", 
"FOI", "RTIA", "FOIL", "ATI", "freedom of information", "right to information", "access to information". This 
search was limited to the period 1998-2018 and articles published in peer-reviewed journals. This keyword 
search, performed within titles, abstracts and keywords of papers, generated more than 3.000 studies.   
Second, this broad search strategy has been refined by selecting key journals to be included in the 
analysis. Ten journals have been chosen considering journal impact data from SCImago Journal & Country 
Rank portal and Google H5 Index. 
These ten journals belonged to the top Sitecore percentile (Q1) considering SCImago Journal & Country 






Table 1: Journal impact 
N. Journal Title SJR 2017 Google  
H5 Index 
1 American Political Science Review 8,595 59 
2 Annual Review of Political Science 5,109 36 
3 Governance 3,000 35 




5 Journal of European Public Policy 2,834 51 
6 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5,407 44 
7 Public Administration 1,989 38 
8 Public Administration Review 3,023 51 
9 Regulation and Governance 1,866 32 
10 Journal of Politics 4,22 48 
 
Finally, a manual search of articles among the ten journals has highlighted further six articles not in-
cluded in Scopus examination. 
Table 2: Articles selection 






1 American Political Science Review 3 0 3 
2 Annual Review of Political Science 1 0 1 
3 Governance 13 0 13 
4 Government Information Quarterly 55 4 59 
5 Journal of European Public Policy 4 1 5 
6 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3 0 3 
7 Public Administration 4 0 4 
8 Public Administration Review 5 1 6 
9 Regulation and Governance 1 0 1 
10 Journal of Politics 1 0 1 
 Total 90 6 96 
 
As shown in the previous table, Government Information quarterly has published in the last twenty years 59 
articles in the field of freedom of information laws, while other journals (American Political Science Review, 
Annual Review of Political Science, Regulation and Governance or Journal of politics) have published only a 
limited number of articles. This means that this topic corresponds to a specific area of interest, which is lim-
ited to a few journals.   
d) Measure article impact 
The impact of the articles within each journal has been measured using the total number of cita-
tions; we downloaded from Google Scholar the articles' citations data as at 22 August 2018. The following 
table shows the top ten articles by citation. 
 
Table 3: Top ten papers by total citations 
Author Title Journal Total 
Citations 







Understanding risks, benefits, and strategic alterna-









Perceptions of transparency of government policy-




 Janssen, K. The influence of the PSI directive on open govern-




Héritier, A. Composite democracy in Europe: The role of trans-
parency and access to information 






Non mission-based in results-oriented public man-
agement: the case of freedom of information 
Public Administration Review 171 
Kassen, M. A promising phenomenon of open data: A case study 




Worthy, B. More open but not more Trusted? The effect of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 on the United 




Internet information-seeking and its relation to sup-




Roberts, A.S. Spin control and freedom of information: lessons for 
the United Kingdom from Canada 
Public Administration 136 
 
Since "reporting only the total number of citations would favour older, well-cited articles over newer ones" 
(Massaro et al., 2016), we have also considered the average number of citations per year. The following ta-
ble lists the top ten articles ranked by the average number of citations per year.   
Eight papers compare in all the tables (total citations and the average number of citations per year) suggest-
ing that the year of publication is not that relevant in determining the number of citations. 











Martínez, I., Luna-Reyes, L.F. 
Understanding risks, benefits, and strategic alternatives 
of social media applications in the public sector 54 271 
McDermott, P. Building open government 52 361 
Kosack, S., Fung, A. Does transparency improve governance? 41 124 
Kassen, M. 
A promising phenomenon of open data: A case study of 
the Chicago open data project 40 159 
 Janssen, K. 
The influence of the PSI directive on open government 
data: An overview of recent developments 36 217 
Relly, J.E., Sabharwal, M. 
Perceptions of transparency of government policymak-
ing: A cross-national study 31 246 
Worthy, B. 
More open but not more Trusted? The effect of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 on the United King-
dom Central Government 21 145 
Cuillier, D., Piotrowski, S.J. 
Internet information-seeking and its relation to support 
for access to government records 18 142 
Hazell, R., Worthy, B. Assessing the performance of freedom of information 18 124 
Michener, G. 
How cabinet size and legislative control shape the 





d) Define an analytical review framework 
The framework was defined, in a first step, considering ten articles although, at a later stage, it was 
refined to ensure the suitability of the adopted criteria to classify papers. 
The following categories for coding the articles were developed: 
1. location, since countries have adopted Freedom of information laws in different periods, for differ-
ent reasons and to achieve different outcomes and, cultural, legal or political context may affect the 
introduction of these regulations, 
2. the research method used for analysis, distinguishing mainly between qualitative and quantitative 
studies, with the purpose to verify whether findings can be generalized,   
3. research theme: the purpose was to highlight specific areas of interest, to better understand the 
scientific dialogue. 
e) Test literature review validity 
"External validity is concerned with whether the results of a study can be generalized" (Dumay J., 
Bernardi C., Guthrie J., Demartini P., 2016). The titles, abstracts, and text of the 96 articles located in step 
three have been examined selecting those focusing on the "freedom of information laws" topic to ensure 
that articles included in the literature review were relevant, ending up with a list of 74 papers.  Articles 
which used terms as "freedom of information" or "right to know" or "access to information" in an unrelated 
manner have been rejected as their primary focus was on other themes. 
Table 5: Articles coded as relevant 




Total Coded  
as 
relevant 
1 American Political Science Review 3 0 3 1 
2 Annual Review of Political Science 1 0 1 1 
3 Governance 13 0 13 7 
4 Government Information Quarterly 55 4 59 49 
5 Journal of European Public Policy 4 1 5 2 
6 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3 0 3 3 
7 Public Administration 4 0 4 4 
8 Public Administration Review 5 1 6 5 
9 Regulation and Governance 1 0 1 1 
10 Journal of Politics 1 0 1 1 
 Total 90 6 96 74 
 
Internal validity was tested considering the development of the literature, comparing the number of articles 
and their impact in the period considered, as the purpose was to define possible “causal relationships” 
(White and McBurney, 2012). The result of these analyses is presented in the following sections. 
f) Code data using the developed framework 
The 74 articles were manually coded, to identify the essential features of the selected studies, and 
the results were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. 




Analysing the coding performed and also considering other information, the next section provides 
the answers to our initial research questions: 
RQ1: How is the literature developing for freedom of information laws? 
RQ2: What is the focus of the literature? Also, specifically:   
5. What are the factors affecting the introduction of Foi laws? 
6. What are the factors which guarantee citizens’ right to know? 
7. What are the main issues affecting the performance of these laws? 
8. Which are the outcomes of these laws? 
RQ3: What is the future/are the implications for research on freedom of information? 
 
2.2 Results of the analysis 
2.2.1 How is the literature developing for freedom of information 
The following aspects have been explored to answer the first research question: the number of pa-
pers published by journals included in the review, author demographics, regions of search and, research 
methods used. 
a) Journals and papers published 
The following figure (fig. 2) shows that the three journals which have published the highest number of arti-
cles on freedom of information laws are Government Information Quarterly (49), Governance (7) and Public 
Administration Review (5) indicating that citizens’ right to know is a topic mainly examined in journals deal-
ing with informational sciences and public administration. 
 
Figure 2: Number of papers on Freedom of information law published in each journal 
The research on Freedom of Information laws has followed an irregular trend during the period considered. 
While in 2001 there were, for the journals examined, no articles published on this topic, in 2010 and 2018 
the number of articles published increased consistently, overall if we consider that for the year 2018 only 






Figure 3: Freedom of information research. 1998-2018 
The analysis of papers issued in the three leading journals considered in this literature review, has demon-
strated that while Government Information Quarterly has placed a continuous attention on Freedom of In-
formation laws, Public Administration Review has focused its attention on this topic mainly in the period 
1999-2001 while Governance increased its attention on this subject since 2009.   
 
 
Figure 4: Articles published in the leading three journals 
 
b) Author demographics: 
The 74 papers examined have been written mainly by academics (65 papers). Practitioners contribute little 
(5 papers) to the freedom of information research debate and only five papers have been co-written by ac-
ademics and practitioners. 
An analysis of the 83 authors who have published the 74 articles has revealed that the interest for the topic 
is widespread and publications are not the result of a minority of productive scholars. While 24 papers have 
been written by more than one author, only ten authors have written more than one paper. This means that 




cus their attention on Freedom of information laws after their first article. The prominent authors in the 
subject are Worthy B., Roberts A., Relly J. E., and Birkinshaw P., who have published (or co-authored) four 
articles. Moreover, 6 of these authors have written articles which are included in the thirteen articles which 
have received more citations. 
 
Figure 5:  Authors who have published several articles on the topic considered 
c) Geographic context 
Table 6 illustrates the distribution of research on freedom of information laws by continent between 1998-
2018. 66% of studies on citizens' right to information refer to two continents: America and Europe. Never-
theless, focusing the attention on countries, it appears that American studies refer mainly to Northern 
countries, while European studies refer mainly to the UK. 






Cross-national comparative 6,41% 
International organisations 1,28% 
No geographic context specified 1,28% 
Total 100,00% 
Table 6: Distribution of research on freedom of information laws. 
 
Moreover, the following figure (Fig.6) suggests that while studies referred to America and Europe are spread 
over the period 1998-2008, cross-country analyses have been developed only since 2009, while research lo-
cated in Asia and Africa seem to start only after 2003. The absence of publications in 2001 suggests that ter-






Figure 6:  Most studied continents 
 
d) Research methodology 
Fig.6 illustrates research methodologies that scholars have employed to study freedom of information laws 
in the period 1998-2018. It shows, that qualitative analyses are the research methodology most commonly 
used to study this topic, as papers usually describe freedom of information laws and their enactment in a 
country. 
 
Figure 7:  Research methods employed 
 
However, in the last decade scholars have started to use quantitative studies and field experiments to inves-
tigate citizens' right to know.  Earlier qualitative analyses have probably created a favourable theoretical 
grounding for the development of quantitative analyses. 
Moreover, experiments in the freedom of information field seem to be very useful in verifying the function-




tions' responses to citizens' requests, to analyse the delay in responses or to verify whether public entities 
are more responsive to a Foi request than to an informal ask. 
 
Figure 8:  Research methods employed over time 
 
2.2.2 The focus of freedom of information literature 
The literature review has shown that in the period 1998 -2018 scholars and practitioners have fo-
cused their attention on the following aspects: 
1. preconditions for the introduction of freedom of information laws, 
2. conditions which enable citizens to exercise the right of access to public information effectively, 
3. performance of Freedom of information laws and issues emerged during the enactment of these 
laws, 
4. outcomes achieved by the introduction of Foi laws, 
5. theories which help explain Foil processes. 
The following table shows that 31.08% of papers investigate conditions which are fundamental to 
ensure citizens' right to know while 29.73% of papers focus the attention on laws performance. Low atten-
tion has been placed on freedom of information outcomes (13%), and only in one case scholars have tried 
to theorise freedom of information processes. 






Preconditions required for the introduction of freedom of information 15 20,27% 
Conditions which enable citizens to exercise the right of access to public information effec-
tively 
23 31,08% 
Performance of Freedom of information laws 22 29,73% 
Outcomes of Foi laws 13 17,57% 
Theories explaining Foi processes 1 1,35% 





1. What are the factors affecting the introduction of Foi laws? 
Papers which focus the attention on preconditions required for the introduction of freedom of in-
formation laws have highlighted that several determinants affect the adoption of these acts (Table 8). We 
have classified these factors in two categories, external and internal determinants, considering governments 
point of view. 
The first category refers to pressure exercised by international organizations and the spread of international 
norms referred to democratisation and transparency: the passing of Foi is more likely when Intergovern-
mental organizations of which the country is a member or country’s regional neighbourhood have already 
adopted these laws (Berliner D., 2014). 
 The second category includes civil society pressure, lobby pressure to maintain limited access to strategic 
information and competition in the political system. This latter factor could be even more powerful than 
domestic civil society’s pressure or International institutions campaigns in creating the circumstances for 
the introduction of Foi laws. On the one hand, “when ruling groups face uncertainty over their future con-
trol of office”, institutionalising transparency can ensure that “they will not be shut out of access to gov-
ernment information and tools of monitoring in the future” (Berliner D., 2014). On the other hand, political 
leaders delay or resist the approval of strong freedom of information laws "when they control parliament, 
and yield to strong laws because of imposition, symbolic ambition, or concessions when they do not." 
(Michener G., 2015). 
 
Table 8: Precondition of Foil 
 
  
• internal determinants Political competition Berliner, D. (2014), (2017) 
McClean, T. (2010) 
 Political power Michener, G. (2015) 
Fenster, M. (2017) 
Relly, J.E., Cuillier, D. (2010) 
 Lobbying Relly, J.E., Schwalbe, C.B. (2016) 
Whitford, A.B.(2008) 
 Civil society pressure Hobbs, W.R., Roberts, M.E. (2018) 
Ingrams, A. (2018) 
Relly, J.E., Cuillier, D. (2010) 
 
• external determinants Pressure from international or-
ganizations, the spread of inter-
national norms related to de-
mocratization and transparency 
Ingrams, A. (2018) 
Janssen, K.(2011) 
McDermott, P.(2010) 
Bugdahn, S. (2007) (2005) 
Gathegi, J.N.(2005) 
 
2. What are the factors which guarantee citizens’ right to know? 
Papers focusing the attention on conditions which enable the right of access to public information 
suggest that these refer mainly to the following factors (Table 9):   
1) the quality of Foi laws since sometimes these laws have only the purpose of ensuring political support for 
parties which promoted them. In too many cases, they "become little more than window dressing" (Mich-
ener G., 2011) since the disclosure of public information finds a lot of restrictions linked to the fact that bu-
reaucrats and politicians do not want to expose their conduct to public scrutiny. The Bush administration, 
for example, limited information access to protect the actions and decisions of the administration and the 
private interest of its primary supporters (oil and gas companies) selling this restriction to US citizens as es-
sential to preventing terrorism (Jeager P.T., 2007). In China, the regulation on access to information do not 
set out the principle of “maximum disclosure” so that for public administrations disclosure is not the gen-




2) public demand for information and civil society’s awareness of its rights. Freedom of information laws re-
quire active civil societies to produce good outcomes; citizens, journalists, and academics play an important 
role, not only in stimulating legislation but also in its implementation. For example, Roberts A. (2010), has 
found that in India “citizens and civil society organisations have been able to use RTIA to fight mismanage-
ment and corruption and improve governmental responsiveness” while Camaj L. (2016) has found that the 
low internal demand for access to information linked to the low levels of citizen awareness and the high 
poverty rate has not driven substantial changes in the political realm. Empirical evidence shows that the po-
tential of Foi is undervalued by journalists and politicians while citizens requests refer overall to personal 
information and not to information about decision-making processes, 
3) availability of ICT, which simplifies citizens’ access to public information and organizations’ storage, rec-
ord management and release of this information. The study of Cuillier D. and Piotrowski S.T., 2009, has 
shown that access to public records is more frequent for those who are more educated and active in seek-
ing information on line. In the same vein, Gebremichael M.D. and Jackson J.W. (2006) have shown that the 
digital divide affects citizens’ possibility of accessing information, 
4) institutional capacity which includes several components: the availability of financial, human and techno-
logical resources, bureaucratic skills, managers and employees’ commitment to the law, internal and exter-
nal oversight to reinforce that commitment (Camaj L., 2016). 
 
Table 9: Conditions which enable citizens to exercise the right of access to public information 
 
 
quality of foi laws Cornella, A. (1998) 
Birkinshaw, P.J. (1999), (2000) 
Roberts, A.S. (2000) 
Héritier, A. (2003) 
Barker, A. N.(2005) 
Jaeger, P.T. (2007) 
Xiao, W. (2010) 
Villeneuve, j.-p. (2014) 
 
civil society demand for information and awareness of foi laws Piotrowsk, S.J., Zangh, Y., Yu, W. (2009) 
Roberts, A.S. (2010) 
Nam, T. (2012) 
Camaj, l. (2016) 
Peekhaus, W.(2011) 
 
availability of ICT Gebremichael, M.D., Jackson, J.W. (2006) 
Cuillier, D., Piotrowski, S.J. (2009) 
 
institutional capacity:  
 -availability of financial resources Roberts, A.S. (2000) 
 -formalized procedures Lor, P.J., Van As, A. (2002) 
 -managers and employee’s commitment Koga, T. (2003) 
Piotrowsk, S.J., Zangh, Y., Yu, W. (2009) 
Wood, A.K., Lewis, D.E. (2017) 
 -internal and external oversight Koga, T. (2003) 
Relyea, H.C. (2009) 
Piotrowsk, S.J., Zangh, Y., Yu, W. (2009) 
Camaj, l. (2016) 
 -employees’ skill to handle information and availability of 
technologies 
Mutshewa, A. (2007) 
Özdemirci, F.(2008) 
Shepherd, E., Stevenson, A., Flinn, A. (2010) 
Whitmore, A. (2012) 
Camaj,L. (2016) 
 
 - training for employees Roberts, A.S. (2010) 
   






3. What are the main issues affecting the performance of these laws? 
Some studies focusing on how Foi laws perform (Table 5) have highlighted that their practical implementa-
tion is jeopardized by several issues. Findings have highlighted that the level of compliance to Foi laws de-
pend on the type of requester, since information requested by journalists and vulnerable groups encounter 
more resistance, and on the type of requests, since compliance is higher for private access than for infor-
mation related to policy making or policy issues. This suggests that the low levels of government compliance 
to laws on access to information in several cases depend on the political will and the interests of internal 
political groups or on the bureaucratic will and the need to hide mismanagement. 
Moreover, the performance of Foi laws depend on the capability of both civil servants and politicians to 
consider access to information as "a public service" delivering information promptly and adequately (Cerril-
lo-i-Martínez A., 2011).   Hence, also the structure created for the implementation of the law is important, 
especially the following components: 
1. bureaucratic capacity, like training for employees or ICT technologies and skills, 
2. bureaucratic organisation, like the presence of effective systems of appealing denials to ensure the pos-
sibility for citizens to obtain the respect of rules, the definition of clear rules which limit discretion im-
peding delays in the release of information, the integration of Foi in the organisations’ objectives, since 
transparency usually are not included in the agencies’ annual performance plans although it is a legal 
requirement, the presence of independent oversight, since information disclosure committees must 
control bureaucrat's discretion, the possibility to release of information using administrations' websites 
to reduce the discretion of street-level bureaucrats. 
Two main issues have characterised the right to access in these two last decades:   
1) the need to balance citizens right to information and citizens' security. Events of September 11 have 
demonstrated that public information available on administrations websites could be used by terrorists. 
However, this has led to a reduction of public administrations accountability, which is not always justified by 
the need to protect national security interests (Feinberg, L. E., 2004; Strickland, L.S.,2005; Hogenboom, K., 
2008); 
2) the large part of public information recently subtracted to disclosure. On the one side, outsourcing pro-
moted by NPM has transferred part of public activities, and consequently the related information, to con-
tractors or private entities which are not subject to Foi laws. On the other side, intergovernmental organisa-
tions, which in last decades have gained much power affecting the content of national public policies, are 
characterized by secretiveness more than transparency (Lewis, C., 2016; Roberts, A., 2004). 
Moreover, some studies have highlighted that the presence of minorities speaking different languages de-
creases the likelihood of obtaining an answer to information requests probably because of language barriers 
(Spáč, P., Voda, P., Zagrapan, J., 2018). 
 
Table 10: Factors affecting the performance of freedom of information laws 
 
-Political will Birkinshaw, P. (2002) 
 
-Integration of Foi laws in organizational objectives and processes 
 
Piotrowsk, S.J., 
Rosenbloom, D.H. (2002) 
 
-Definition of explicit rules which limit bureaucratic discretion, 
situations subtracted to disclosure defining times of response 
Lewis, C. (2016) 
Wasike, B. (2016) 
Rodríguez, R.P., Rossel, C.(2018) 
Almazar, T., Aspinwall, M., Crow D. 
(2018) 
 
-Presence of independent oversight Choi, J.M. (2018) 
 





-An efficient system of appealing denials Hazell, R., Worthy, B. (2010) 
 
-Information disclosure considered as a public service Cerrillo-i-Martínez, A. (2011) 
 
-Presence of language minorities Spáč, P., Voda, P., Zagrapan, J. (2018) 
 
-The need to balance disclosure and secrecy, disclosure and privacy and 
disclosure and governability 
Halchin, L.E. (2002) 
Feinberg, L. E. (2004) 
Strickland, L.S. (2005) 
Hogenboom, K. (2008) 
Relyea, H.C. (2009) 
Lamdan, S.S. (2013) 
Roberts, A.S. (2005) 
Newell, B.C. (2014) 
 
-The shift of power to intergovernmental organisations Roberts, A. (2004) 
 
 
4. Which are the outcomes of these laws? 
Perritt Jr. H.H. and Rustad Z. (2000), has suggested that for “individual freedom of information ac-
cess can be understood as part of fundamental freedom of expression. For society, freedom of information is 
a tool for controlling government and thus serving democratic values and has legitimating effects by giving 
citizens a feeling of being closer to policy decisions. The legitimacy of institutions increases when the public 
knows what the institutions are doing. Compliance with the law increases when the law is available. Ac-
countability and quality of government decision making improve when members of the public have infor-
mation allowing them to express meaningful views before decisions are made”. 
The review of the literature has shown that laws about freedom of information, even when effec-
tively implemented, have reached their goals only in part. Sometimes, they have ensured transparency and 
more accountability reducing information asymmetry and contributing in the fight against corruption in the 
public sector. However, they seem not to be effective in increasing trust in government or Parliament un-
derstanding. These laws can be considered only the basis of a culture of openness, since they provide a ba-
sis for the introduction of open data platforms useful to provide a free public access to official files and raise 
transparency and efficiency of government, stimulating civic engagement and consequently the knowledge 




Table 11: Freedom of information laws outcomes 
 
 
Accountability and reduction of information asymmetry Perritt Jr., H.H., Rustad, Z. (2000) 
Birkinshaw, P. (2010) 
Worthy, B.(2010) 
Hazell, R., Glover, M. (2011)  
Hazell, R., Bourke, G., Worthy, B. (2012) 
 
Transparency with limited costs of releasing information Relly, J.E., Sabharwal, M. (2009) 
Birkinshaw, P.(2010) 
Worthy, B. (2010) 
Hazell, R., Bourke, G., Worthy, B.(2012) 
Cherry, M., McMenemy, D. (2013) 
Wagner, A.J. (2013) 
 
The increase of investor confidence Relly, J.E., Sabharwal, M. (2009) 
 
Better service delivery Peisakhin, L., Pinto, P. (2010) 
 




Prevention of corruption Peisakhin, L., Pinto, P.(2010) 
Relly, J.E. (2012) 
Schnell, S. (2018) 
 
Creation of bases for open government Kassen, M. (2012) 
Henninger, M. (2018) 
 
 
2.2.3 What the future for research on freedom of information is 
The developing body of the literature suggests that further researches are necessary to clarify ac-
tions and circumstances which can ensure a valid right to know and to evaluate how these laws perform.   
• Evaluation of results considering the role of the main actors 
The literature review has shown that citizens' right to know will require more than just the approval of a 
law. Freedom of information results from the interplay of three main actors: citizens, acting to gain recogni-
tion of a right and on whom the exercise of the right also depends; politicians, on whom the issue of good 
regulations depends; bureaucrats, on whom the implementation of laws depends. Also, other actors may 
intervene, as international organisations which could promote the approval of these laws in support to citi-
zens' demand, or lobbies, which try to shape the right according to their interests.   
This suggests that there is a need for a pooled analysis of the actions carried out by all the actors involved 
for a complete assessment of results, since these results depend on the joint action of all the players. A 
good law on citizens' right to know cannot achieve positive outcomes if bureaucrats do not effectively im-
plement it or if citizens do not exercise the right of access. The literature review has highlighted that studies 
have focused their attention separately on the role played by the bureaucratic or political components, and 
sometimes have overlooked the role of citizens. 
• Analysis of cultural determinants to understand contexts 
Moreover, studies which have analysed preconditions for the introduction of citizens' right to know have 
not explored the role played by cultural determinants. The culture analysis could help to understand con-
texts and forces acting therein for the implementation or non-implementation of regulations as well as to 
explain results obtained by regulations. 
• The role of the political environment   
Some studies have suggested that Foi laws are the result of dynamics which characterise political environ-
ments: they depend on government power over parliament or competition among political parties (Mich-
ener G., 2015; Berliner D. 2014, 2017). This suggests that comparisons among political contexts which fa-
vour the adoption of these laws may contribute to defining the general features of the framework under 
which citizens' right to know can be granted. 
• Evolution of regulations 
Citizens' right to information is the result of a process that sometimes is composed by several steps: effec-
tive access to information can be the result of some regulatory amendments which are introduced over 
several years, since contextual conditions evolve along with demands for transparency.  This suggests that it 
is important to describe this evolution, since the performance of the laws may change over the years as a 
consequence of the changing conditions under which the right operates. Studies included in the literature 
generally take a snapshot of a country in a specific moment, while it could be interesting to analyse how the 
citizens' right grows over time. 
• In-depth studies on outcomes 
Studies have focused their attention mainly on the most critical outcomes of Foi laws: transparency and ac-




dom of Information Act also aimed at raising citizens' trust in government. Only a few studies have exam-
ined these indirect goals as well as the issues related to their achievement. 
• Involvement of practitioners 
To understand the functioning of laws and issues related to their enactment, it is essential to involve practi-
tioners who can provide insight on some factors which limit in practice access to public information. The lit-
erature review has shown that studies have been conducted mainly by scholars, although practitioners may 
suggest new directions for investigations in the field. 
• Exploring new contexts 
The literature has suggested that studies have focused their attention mainly on Europe and North America 
so that further research can investigate the situation in Africa or Latin America. 
Moreover, scholars’ attention in these years has been placed mainly on central government actions; further 
studies are needed to clarify the enactment of these laws at several levels of administrations, examining the 
different results achieved and their causes. 
 
3. Conclusions 
This literature review has highlighted that freedom of information requires more than a law and 
that also to define how these laws perform is intricate since several factors and several points of view have 
to be included in the evaluation. 
Nevertheless, this complexity also suggests that there is still room for further research on the topic 
since more studies are required to generalise findings on conditions and results obtained by Foi laws. 
We have underlined that investigations can involve a new context and those who work in the field. 
We have also suggested an in-depth analysis on cultural and political factors affecting the performance of 
these laws. We have stressed the need to consider the citizens' right to know over time evaluating actions 
of all parties involved. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underline that this paper has some limitations. First, it considers on-
ly articles published in leading journals and, although this may suggest that only essential contributions are 
included, other significant findings may be excluded. Secondly, the validity of the results shown is limited at 
the time of analysis, since future contributions could change them. 
Despite these limitations, findings have highlighted several variables impacting on Freedom of in-
formation laws, their adoption, their performance and their outcomes which should be considered by poli-
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